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I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance has been variously defined,1 classified,2 and packaged
around the nature of the risk being transferred and res protected.
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1. There is no universally accepted definition of insurance. Nevertheless, it is gen-
erally accepted that the most distinguishing feature of an insurance transaction
is that it is an "arrangement for transferring and distributing risks." ROBERT E.
KEETON & ALAN I. WmIss, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAiMENTAL PRInCI-
PLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, ANi CO MERCIAL PRACTICES, § 1.1(b), at 3 (student ed.
1988).
2. Historically, insurance contracts were classified on the basis of the nature of the
risk being transferred. Consequently, three broad classes of insurance gained
prominence. 'These three main classes of insurance are commonly referred to as
'fire and marine,' 'life and accident,' and 'casualty' insurance." Id. Rule 2.4
§ 1.5(a), at 18. The advent of the automobile has led to the development of a
fourth classification. Most insurance contracts are, however, packaged policies.
A packaged policy combines a number of individual property, liability, and medi-
cal insurance coverages into a single policy. For example, a typical automobile
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Within any specific classification, however, the principal themes of
risk transference and management are manifested in the insurance
contract to suit the risk tolerance level of the particular company un-
derwriting the risk of loss. An insurance company's particular risk
tolerance level is primarily reflected in any one or combination of
three sections of the insurance contract. Those sections are the exclu-
sions, limits of liability, and conditions provisions.3 Because risk tol-
erance levels are unique to each company, these sections, more so
than any other in an insurance contract, are likely to be the most va-
ried and distinctive feature of the final product - the insurance pol-
icy. Variations are specifically reflected in the terminology used in
specific provisions or in the conceptualization of the scope of the risk
covered.
Within no classification or type of insurance, however, is there
greater variation in terms of terminology, scope of coverage, and ex-
clusions than in automobile insurance contracts. Variations in these
provisions of the automobile insurance contract are so extensive that
resolution of automobile insurance disputes is especially fact-sensi-
tive.4 Therefore, litigating parties in automobile insurance disputes
insurance contract customarily provides liability, medical, and property cover-
ages in addition to other types of protection.
3. Insurance contracts, in general, almost always begin with "statements describing
a broad scope of protection which is then reduced or limited by various types of
restrictive provisions," such as those listed above. Id. § 4.1(a), at 286. Exclu-
sions, limits of liability, and condition provisions are not the exclusive tools used
by insurers to limit the risks transferred. See id. It is not uncommon for insurers
to attempt to limit the risks transferred in the general coverage provisions of the
policy. Courts have viewed this practice with a great deal of skepticism. Conse-
quently, it is generally agreed that insurance coverage provisions are to be con-
strued broadly in favor of the existence of coverage and exclusions are to be
construed narrowly against the insurance company. See, e.g., American States
Ins. Co. v. Martin, 662 So. 2d 245 (Ala. 1995); Whispering Creek Condominium
Owner Ass'n v. Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co., 774 P.2d 176 (Alaska 1989); Averett v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 505 (Ariz. 1994); FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Co., 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Progressive Ins. Co. v. Estate of Wesley, 702 So.
2d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Johnston Equip. Corp. v. Industrial Indem., 489
N.W.2d 13 (Iowa 1992); Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 681 P.2d 15 (Kan.
1984); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. White, 993 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
4. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 76 Cal. Rptr. 281, 283 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969)("American decisions considering repair and maintenance as a 'use' reach
disparate results dictated by variations in the facts or policy provisions."); AIG
Haw. Ins. Co. v. Vicente, 891 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Haw. 1995)("We must note, how-
ever, that because decisions in this area are extremely fact-sensitive, the pres-
ence or absence of one additional factor may change the result."); Belas v.
Melanovich, 372 A.2d 478, 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)("The decisions in this area
often appear to be delicately balanced on the peculiar facts of the individual
cases." (quoting Gillen v. Globe Indem. Co., 377 F.2d 328, 333 (8th Cir. 1967)).
In Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 599 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), the
court observed in frustration:
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frequently are unable to cite apposite case law.5 Variations in policy
terminology, scope, and the fact-sensitive nature of automobile insur-
ance litigation hamper continuity in the application of traditional in-
surance doctrines, principles, and practices. 6 Consequently, there
remain many issues upon which courts are left to write on clean
slates.7
Over the past decade, a number of insurance companies have ex-
perimented with limiting their risk exposure for comprehensive dam-
age to an insured vehicle by relying upon an exclusion within Part D-
Coverage For Damage To Your Auto. This provision, commonly
known as the illegal activity exclusion, provides that coverage does
not apply to loss sustained while an insured person commits or at-
tempts to commit a felony, or by the insured person's involvement in
an illegal activity.8 This exclusion is a hidden landmine for the un-
wary insured. It provides the insurer, should it desire to deny cover-
age, at least a minimal basis for rejection of the claim if damage to the
vehicle occurred while the insured was engaged in any illegal conduct.
On the surface, such a denial might seem justified and morally correct
to those overly sensitized by the number of illegal activities that occur
involving automobiles. However, the illegal activity exclusion should
not be examined solely from the perspective of the extreme case.
Rather, it should also be considered from the perspective of the indi-
The experience of assimilating divergent fact situations into the basic
legal construction given such insuring agreements has produced an ar-
ray of peripheral principles which are frequently relied upon for deter-
mining the existence or nonexistence of coverage under automobile
liability insurance policies .... The parties on appeal have indiscrimi-
nately cited a number of cases reflecting these peripheral principles,
with virtually no attention given to distinguishing them factually. At
best, they are of nebulous value absent being conceptually categorized.
An attempt to do so reveals that this court is writing on a clean slate
insofar as Missouri case law is concerned.
599 S.W.2d at 15.
5. See supra note 4.
6. It has been observed that a number of factors are important when coverage ques-
tions arise in automobile insurance; consequently, it is very "difficult to predict
with certainty either exactly who will be insureds or under what circumstances
persons will be entitled to coverage benefits." KEETON & Wmiss, supra note 1,
§ 4.9(a), at 386.
7. It is not uncommon for courts when addressing a novel issue concerning automo-
bile insurance to begin the analysis with a general proposition of insurance law.
A general proposition, however, should be distinguished from a rule of law. A
general proposition is something offered for consideration or acceptance. It is not
accorded the persuasive value of a rule of law and should be adhered to only in
the clearest of cases. The substantive value of a legal proposition is analogous to
that of the inference of negligence which flows out of a violation of statutes in a
typical negligence action.
8. The illegal activity exclusion is founded upon the same public policy rationale as
the intentional injury exclusion. For a detailed discussion, see infra Parts II and
Ill.
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vidual whose coverage is invalidated for traffic violations, such as (1)
running a stop sign; (2) exceeding the speed limit; (3) operating a vehi-
cle with defective equipment; or (4) driving while intoxicated. The pri-
mary inquiry of this article is whether the mere fact that (1) a vehicle
has been used in an unlawful manner, or (2) an unlawful event may
have occurred during its use by insured, should relieve an insurer
from its obligation to provide comprehensive coverage.
The objective of this article is to develop an appropriate analytical
basis for evaluating the illegal activity exclusion in the context of au-
tomobile comprehensive coverage. Because the illegal activity exclu-
sion has not been the subject of any reported decision in the context of
comprehensive coverage, this article attempts to achieve its goal by
examining intentional injury and prohibitive use exclusions in the
context of automobile liability and collision coverages, respectively.
The purpose of this examination is to ascertain whether the analytical
tools employed in the liability and collision coverages arenas are ap-
propriate in the context of the primary thesis.
Part II of this article details the most significant provisions of auto-
mobile insurance contracts. This part, though primarily introductory
in nature, reflects the skepticism with which courts view attempts by
insurers to limit coverage in general. Part II explores the intentional
injury exclusion in the context of automobile liability insurance. This
part attempts to identify the methodologies used by courts in assess-
ing the validity of the exclusion. Part II demonstrates how public pol-
icy influences the manner in which courts construe the intentional
injury exclusion, and concludes that the analytical standards used to
determine the validity of such exclusions reflect the policy concerns
inherent in mandatory automobile liability insurance.
Part III examines prohibitive use restrictions contained in car
rental agreements. Part III explores the relationship between colli-
sion damage waivers, prohibitive use provisions, and collision insur-
ance policies in general. This part demonstrates that the validity of
prohibitive use provisions contained in rental car agreements, though
not technically insurance contracts, is determined according to gen-
eral principles of insurance contract interpretation. Part III also de-
tails the analytical standards used by courts to assess the validity of
prohibitive use restrictions.
Parts IV and V address the primary thesis. These parts document
the relationship between collision and comprehensive coverages.
They also examine the collision and comprehensive coverages insuring
agreement. This insuring agreement affords coverage only for "direct
and accidental loss." The primary thesis emanates out of the difficulty
of formulating a universal all-inclusive definition of the term "acciden-
tal." Parts IV and V discuss the general rule that "accidental" for pur-
poses of collision and comprehensive coverage is ascertained from the
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perspective of the insured. It also recognizes the presumption of valid-
ity generally accorded to property coverages exclusions. This pre-
sumption, however, merely favors the rights of insurers to include
such provisions in the respective coverages and does not determine
whether such exclusions are enforceable in the context of a specific
case. Two conclusions are reached. First, a case-by-case approach
should be used to determine if an insurer is relieved from its obliga-
tion to provide comprehensive coverage when (1) a vehicle has been
used in an unlawful manner, or (2) an unlawful event may have oc-
curred during its use by an insured. Second, traditional tools of insur-
ance contract interpretations should be used to determine whether an
accident has occurred for purposes of comprehensive coverage.
II. AUTOMOBILE POLICY IN GENERAL
Automobile insurance policies are for the most part uniformly or-
ganized. They consist of the (1) declaration sheet; (2) agreement; (3)
definition section; (4) Part A-Liability Coverage; (5) Part B-Medical
Payments Coverage; (6) Part C-Uninsured Motorists Coverage; (7)
Part D-Coverage For Damage To Your Auto; (8) Part E-Duties After
An Accident or Loss; (9) Part F-General Provisions.9 The declaration
sheet personalizes the policy with regard to the specific name and ad-
dress of the insured, vehicle insured, policy period, limits of coverages,
deductibles, premiums, and endorsements. The agreement compo-
nent of the policy does little more than state that "[in return for pay-
ment of the premium and subject to all the terms of this policy, we
agree with you as follows."1o The agreement section is followed by the
definition component of the respective coverage. In this section of the
policy, insurance companies attempt to clearly and unambiguously de-
fine the more important concepts as used in that particular coverage
section.l"
Parts: A-Liability Coverage; B-Medical Payments Coverage; C-Un-
insured Motorist Coverage; and, D-Coverage For Damage To Your
Auto provide protections that are unique to the respective type of cov-
erage. Each of these parts, however, contains an insuring agreement,
and all but Part D contain an omnibus clause. 12 Both the insuring
agreements and omnibus clauses in each of these coverages are sepa-
9. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICES, INC., PERSONAL AUTo POLICY (1985), reprinted
in ALLIANCE OF AhmIRicAN INSUiRERS, 1989 POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF INSUR-
ANCE 2-11 (1989) [hereinafter PERSONAL AUTO POLICY].
10. Id. at 2.
11. The definition section of the policy is not the only section of the policy in which
definitions may be found. It is a common practice to place the definition of an
extremely important term after the specific provision in which the term appears.
This practice is also designed to provide clarity and to avoid ambiguity. For a
detailed discussion of ambiguity, see infra Part IVA.
12. See PERSONAL AUTO POLICY, supra note 9, at 3-9.
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rate and independent agreements pertaining only to the specific cover-
ages in which they appear.
Insurance companies enjoy the same rights as individuals to limit
their liability and impose whatever conditions they deem appropriate
upon their obligation to provide coverage in a contract of insurance.
The right to freely contract, however, may not be exercised in a man-
ner that violates public policy - either statutorily or judicially dic-
tated. In principle, automobile insurance is designed to provide basic
coverage for virtually every risk contingency that might reasonably
arise out of the use or ownership of an automobile. However, "[a]t the
same time certain limitations are imposed for the purpose of enabling
the insurer to set premiums which will not make the cost of such a
policy prohibitive."13 The interest in providing broad coverage while
maintaining reasonable premiums has been accomplished through the
use of exclusion provisions. Exclusions limit the scope of the coverage
provided; they are to be read with the insuring agreement and inde-
pendent of every other exclusion.1 4
The primary objective of the claims adjuster is to efficiently and
fairly dispose of claims. To achieve this goal, the adjuster must deter-
mine whether the insured is entitled to the proceeds of the policy
whenever a claim is filed. This is commonly referred to as the process
of determining whether coverage exists under the policy. In order to
determine whether coverage exists, the adjuster must carefully read
the policy and consider three very simple questions: "1. Is the claim
within the scope of an insuring agreement? 2. Does any exclusion
eliminate or restrict coverage for the claim? 3. Do any policy condi-
tions affect the coverage for the claim?"15 The "insuring agreement"
represents the starting point for determining the existence of
coverage.
The model automobile liability coverage insuring agreement pro-
vides that:
13. Gerald L. Walter, Jr., Note, 21 LA. L. REV. 835, 836 (1961).
14. See Indiana Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. 1980); Southwest La.
Grain, Inc. v. Howard A. Duncan, Inc., 438 So. 2d 215 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Conti-
nental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209 (Mass. 1984); Hawkeye-
Security Ins. Co. v. Vector Constr. Co., 460 N.W.2d 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990);
American State Ins. Co. v. Slogar, No. C7-90-14, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS 556 (Ct.
App. May 30, 1990)(citing Harrison Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. New Hampshire
Ins. Group, 681 P.2d 875, 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick,
Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979); Engineered Prod., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
368 S.E.2d 674 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chester-OlDonley
& Assoc., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); T.C. Bateson Constr. Co. v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 784 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Harrison
Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Group, 681 P.2d 875 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1984); Weaver v. Drew, No. 96-0454, 1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1304 (Ct. App.
Oct. 15, 1996)(citing Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979).
15. ROBERT J. PRAHL, INTRODUCTION TO CLAIMS 37 (1988).
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A. We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" for which
any "insured" becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. Dam-
ages include pre-judgment interest awarded against the "insured." We will
settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these
damages. In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we
incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this
coverage has been exhausted. We have no duty to defend any suit or settle
any claim for "bodily injury" or "property damage" not covered under this
policy. 1 6
Insuring agreements are coverage provisions that define the scope of
the protection afforded by the respective coverage. The insuring
agreement, while seemingly unambiguous in its own right, is immedi-
ately followed by the omnibus clause and exclusion provisions of the
respective coverage. The liability coverage omnibus clause is a cover-
age provision that extends the protection provided by the insuring
agreement. 17
"Omnibus clause" is a term of art frequently used in discussions of
coverage provisions but rarely employed in insurance contracts.
Rather, most insurance contracts identify persons who are covered as
additional insureds in clauses placed in sections captioned or desig-
nated "persons insured," "definition of insureds," or "additional in-
sureds." The omnibus clause identifies the persons insured for
purpose of the specific type of coverage.' 8 It is common, however, for
insurers to define "persons insured," "definition of insureds," or "addi-
16. PERSONAL AUTo POLICY, supra note 9, at 3.
17. See Stearns-Roger Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 571 P.2d 278 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1976); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1969); Porterfield v. Truck Ins. Exch., 171 N.E.2d 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960);
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 218 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. App. 1966); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Hassell, 426 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1967); Williams v. Forbes, 650 So. 2d 337
(La. Ct. App. 1995); Parker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 503 (Md.
1971); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watkins, 209 So. 2d 630 (Miss. 1968); Weathers v.
Royal Indem. Co., 577 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1979); Capece v. Allstate Ins. Co., 212
A.2d 863 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965); infra notes 18-21.
18. The vast majority of state legislatures have enacted compulsory automobile or
motor vehicle liability insurance laws. These laws employ one or a combination
of two statutory methods to mandate the inclusion of omnibus clauses in every
policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance. Before discussing these methods
it should be noted that in some jurisdictions a legal distinction between "automo-
bile liability policies" and "motor vehicle liability policies" is recognized. The for-
mer policies are said to be matters of individual choice and voluntarily
purchased. The latter policies, however, are typically required in compliance
with Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Statutes and purchased as proof of fi-
nancial responsibility. Because "automobile liabilities policies," unlike motor ve-
hicle liability policies, are not required to be certified they are not subject to the
requirements of the financial responsibility laws. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 152 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. fI1. 1957); Hearty v. Harris, 574 So. 2d 1234 (La.
1991); Perkins v. Perkins, 284 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Lewis v. Mid-
Century Ins. Co., 449 P.2d 679 (Mont. 1968); USF&G v. Walker, 329 P.2d 852
(Okla. 1958); Novak v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 293 N.W.2d 452 (S.D.
1980).
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tional insureds" differently for purposes of the various coverages.
However, insurers may not define the term "insured" or its equivalent
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Statutes (MVSRS) and Compulsory or
Mandatory Liability Statutes (MLS) are the contrivances most employed by state
legislatures to mandate the inclusion of omnibus clauses in liability policies af-
fecting motor vehicles. It is not uncommon to find both sources mandating omni-
bus clause inclusion in a single jurisdiction. See ARiz. REV. STAT. 29-4009 (West
1998 & Supp. 1999); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (West 1971 & Supp. 2000); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 16451 (West 1971 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REV. STAT. § 287-25(2) (1993
& Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-301(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-103
(1999); id. § 61-6-301; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-324(b)(2) (West 2000); id. § 7-
600(1)(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(A) (Michie 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-472
(Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999). MVSRS and MLS statutes are not inconsistent.
The statutes serve different purposes and to some degree compliment each other.
MLS insure that vehicles are insured at all times. MVSRS come into play after
an accident has occurred and create leverage in favor of an individual injured by
an uninsured driver. Together, MLS and MVSRS are designed to totally plug
any holes that might otherwise exist in compulsory liability insurance law.
The vast majority of jurisdictions have ignored MLS; instead, they have uti-
lized MVSRS to require the inclusion of omnibus clauses in motor vehicle liability
policies. See ALA. CODE § 32-7-22(b)(2) (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440(b)(2)
(Michie 1998); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4009(A)(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 1999);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-713(b) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 42-7-413(b) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2902 (1995 & Supp. 1998); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 324.151 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 49-1212 (1994);
625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-317 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 321A.21 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40.3107 (1993 & Supp.
1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:900 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2902-D (West Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-15-43(2)(b)
(1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 303.190(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 485.3091(b) (1997); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 345(b)(2) (McKinney 1996 & Supp.
1999-2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (1993 & Cum. Supp. 1998); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.51(b) (Anderson
1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 806.080 (1997 & 1998 Cum. Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 55-12-122 (1998); TEx. TRANsp. CODE ANN. § 601.076 (West 1999); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 46.29.490 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000); W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-12 (1996
& Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 344.33 (West 1999); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-
405(b)(ii) (Michie 1999). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303 (1999)(requiring
the inclusion of the omnibus clause in the Liability Insurance Statute).
In jurisdictions in which the inclusion of an omnibus clause is not statutorily
mandated in automobile liability insurance contracts, courts use a general public
policy analysis to justify construing omnibus clauses liberally. See, e.g., State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 462 So. 2d 346 (Ala. 1984); Alliance Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 504 P.2d 161 (Kan. 1972); Miller v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 P.2d 336 (Kan. 1970). But see National
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 399 A.2d 877 (Md. 1979) (refusing to construe
omnibus clause liberally in the absence of a statute mandating inclusion);
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 332 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1983); USF&G v. Bon-
ner, 467 So. 2d 955 (Miss. 1985); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 408
S.E.2d 358 (W. Va. 1991).
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in Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage more restrictively than it is
defined in the omnibus provision of Part A-Liability Coverage.i 9
Omnibus coverage is generally provided to others on the basis of
their relationship with the named insured. For example, motor vehi-
cle liability insurance contracts usually include a clause providing
that "covered person" or "person insured" means, in addition to the
"named insured" shown in the declaration, the "spouse" of a named
insured if a resident of the same household, any "family member" who
is a resident of that household, and "relatives" who reside in the same
household as the named insured. These individuals are also addi-
tional insureds for purposes of other coverages provided in the stan-
dard motor vehicle insurance policy.
The liability coverage omnibus clause not only identifies the in-
sured(s) or person(s) covered 20 but also extends coverage to anyone
driving the insured vehicle with the expressed2 ' or general permission
of the named insured.22 Permission, for purposes of extended cover-
19. See, e.g., State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1974); Farmers
Ins. Co. v. Schiller, 597 P.2d 238 (Kan. 1979); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Gartelman, 405 A.2d 779 (Md. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 416 A.2d 734 (Md.
1980).
20. The Insurance Services Office in its 1985 model automobile insurance policy de-
fined "insured" for purposes of the liability omnibus clause as "[y]ou or any 'fam-
ily member' for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or 'trailer,'" and as
"[amny person using 'your covered auto.'" PERSONAL AUTo POLICY, supra note 9, at
3. "Insured" as defined in the above omnibus clause does not require a determi-
nation of whether someone other than the named insured or a family member
had permission to use the covered auto for purposes of extended coverage. In
egregious cases, such as where the permittee was engaged in conversion or the
like, the issue of permission for purposes of the extended coverage under the
model omnibus clause would probably surface. Because of the liberal nature of
the model omnibus clause, the majority of insurance companies have opted to
ignore it and instead provide extended coverage to anyone using the vehicle with
the permission of the named insured. See infra notes 21 and 22.
21. Insurance companies, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, have
the same rights as other individuals to limit their liability and impose whatever
conditions they please upon their obligations. The right of insurance companies
to freely contract is further constrained by the requirement that the exercise of
this right not violate public policy. Consequently, some insurance companies ex-
perienced initial success in limiting the extended coverage of the omnibus clause
by requiring that the user of the automobile have the "express permission of the
named insured." Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mattison, 243 So.
2d 490, 491 (Ala. 1971). In contrast, where the omnibus clause merely requires
the "permission of the named insured," the permission necessary to trigger ex-
tended omnibus coverage can be expressed or implied from the circumstances.
The majority of jurisdictions have either legislatively or judicially limited the
right of insurance companies to restrict omnibus coverage. Consequently, the
language used in omnibus clauses is now well standardized. See supra note 18.
22. Courts have adopted various views in determining the effect of a permissive
user's use of the insured vehicle in excess of the permission granted. Despite
being imprecise and at times abstract in nature, those views have been classified
as follows:
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(1) The liberal or "initial permission" rule provides that if a person has per-
mission to use an automobile in the first instance, any subsequent use while it
remains in her possession though not within the contemplation of the parties is a
permissive use within the terms of the omnibus clause. The only limitation on
this rule is that the subsequent use must not be equivalent to theft or the like.
States which adhere to this view include Arkansas, see, e.g., Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 745 S.W.2d 589 (Ark. 1988); California, see, e.g., Jordan v.
Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Florida, see,
e.g., Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959); Illinois, see,
e.g., Visintin v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 222 N.E.2d 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966); Indi-
ana, see, e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 485 N.E.2d 902
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Louisiana, see, e.g., Carey v. Ory, 421 So. 2d 1003 (La. Ct.
App. 1982); Minnesota, see, e.g., Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 332 N.W.2d
160 (Minn. 1983); Montana, see, e.g., Cascade Ins. Co. v. Glacier Gen. Ins. Co.,
479 P.2d 259 (Mont. 1971); Nebraska, see, e.g., Barry v. Tanner, 250 Neb. 116,
547 N.W.2d 730 (1996); Nevada, see, e.g., USF&G. v. Fisher, 494 P.2d 549 (Nev.
1972); New Hampshire, see, e.g., GEICO v. Johnson, 396 A.2d 331 (N.H. 1978);
New Jersey, see, e.g., Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 730 A.2d 833 (N.J. 1999);
New Mexico, see, e.g., Kitchens v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 896 P.2d 479 (N.M.
1995); Oregon, see, e.g., Ryan v. Western Pac. Ins. Co., 408 P.2d 84 (Or. 1965);
Tennessee, see, e.g., Estate of Adkins v. White Consol. Indus., 788 S.W.2d 815
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); West Virginia, see, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 408 S.E.2d 358 (W. Va. 1991).
(2) The moderate or "minor deviation" rule provides that a permittee is cov-
ered under the omnibus clause so long as her deviation from the permissive use is
minor in nature. States which adhere to this view include Arizona, see, e.g.,
James v. Aetna Life & Cas., 546 P.2d 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Delaware, see,
e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. West Am. Ins. Co., 437 A.2d 165 (Del.
1981); Kansas, see, e.g., Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Loftus, 612 P.2d 1245 (Kan. Ct. App.
1980); Kentucky, see, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hassell, 426 S.W.2d 133 (Ky.
1967); Mississippi, see, e.g., Wade v. Bonner, 409 So. 2d 1333 (Miss. 1982); North
Carolina, see, e.g., Packer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 221 S.E.2d 707 (N.C. Ct. App.
1976); Ohio, see, e.g., Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Selz, 451 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio
1983); Oklahoma, see, e.g., Higgins v. Ridenhour, No. 50-819, 1978 Okla. Civ.
App. LEXIS 112 (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1978); South Dakota, see, e.g., State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ragatz, 571 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1997); Texas, see, e.g.,
Coronado v. Employers' Nat'l. Ins. Co., 596 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1979); Washington,
see, e.g., Eshelman v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 442 P.2d 964 (Wash. 1968); Wisconsin,
see, e.g., Employers Ins. Co. v. Pelczynski, 451 N.W.2d 300 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
(3) The strict or "conversion" rule provides that any deviation from the time,
place, or purpose specified by the person granting permission is sufficient to take
the permittee outside the coverage of the omnibus clause. States adhering to this
view include Maine, see, e.g., Johnson v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 161 A. 496 (Me.
1932); Michigan, see, e.g., Gray v. Sawatzki, 289 N.W. 227 (Mich. 1939).
(4) The broad statutory approach allows courts to liberally construe the omni-
bus clause to provide coverage. One state that follows this approach is Alaska.
See, e.g., Johnson v. USF&G, 601 P.2d 260 (Alaska 1979).
(5) The presumption of permission provides that permission will be pre-
sumed. However, the party asserting that permission did not exist may rebut the
presumption. States that adhere to this view include Hawaii and Vermont. See,
e.g., AIG Hawai'i Ins. Co. v. Vincente, 891 P.2d 1041 (Haw. 1995); American Fi-
delity Co. v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 204 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1964). But see
Columbia Cas. Co. v. Hoohuli, 437 P.2d 99 (Haw. 1968)(applying initial permis-
sion rule).
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age, may be expressed or implied. The doctrine of implied permission
extends the insurer's liability so that it is coextensive with the named
insured's liability to injured third parties under tort doctrines, such as
dangerous instrumentalities and vicarious or imputed negligence.
Thus, the omnibus clause merely affords coverage to the injured party
and the driver of the insured vehicle; it does not expand the coverage
provided in the policy or alter the theories upon which the insurer is
liable.2 3 In other words, the extended coverage provided by the omni-
bus clause is subject to the same conditions, limitations, and excep-
tions that are applicable to the named insured.2 4
Two circumstances must exist in order for extended coverage to en-
sue. First, the vehicle's use must be with the permission of the named
insured, and second, liability for damages must arise out of the vehi-
cle's ownership, maintenance, or use. The first requirement for ex-
tended omnibus coverage - that "use must be with the permission of
the named insured" - consists of two legally significant sub-compo-
nents. Those sub-components are (a) permission; (b) from the named
insured. Both must be present in order to satisfy the first require-
ment. Permission from an owner of an insured motor vehicle will not
suffice for purposes of omnibus coverage if someone other than the
owner is designated the named insured in the insurance policy.2 5 In
essence, "[plermission, whether expressly or impliedly conferred, must
originate in the language or the conduct of the named insured or of
some other person having authority to bind the named insured in that
respect."2 6
(6) Also, a contract-by-contract basis exists. Some states recognize that the
terminology employed in omnibus clauses vary to such a degree that extended
coverage should be determined on a policy by policy basis. Maryland adheres to
this view. See, e.g., National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pintdey, 399 A.2d 877 (Md.
1979).
Litigation involving disputes over whether omnibus coverage extends to per-
mitted users can be divided into two classes: (1) those involving claims resulting
from accidents in which the driver of the insured vehicle was given permission by
the named insured; and (2) those involving claims resulting from accidents in
which the driver of the insured vehicle was given permission to drive the vehicle
by the original permittee. The driver of the vehicle in the latter class of claims is
referred to as a permittee's permittee. For a detailed discussion of the analysis
used to determine coverage in subsequent permittee cases, see Jay M. Zitter, An-
notation, Omnibus Clause as Extending Automobile Liability Coverage to Third
Person Using Car with Consent of Permittee of Named Insured, 21 A.L.R.4th 1146
(1983).
23. See 8 LEE R. Russ & THoiAs F. SEGALLA, COUcH ON INSURANCE 3D, chap. 111,
§ 111:19, at 111-32 (1997).
24. See id. § 111:20, at 111-34.
25. See, e.g., Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mattison, 243 So. 2d 490
(Ala. 1971).
26. 8 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 23, chap. 112, § 112:22, at 111-39; see id. at
§§ 112:25-112:28.
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The circumstances triggering omnibus coverage demonstrate that
whether a "use" comes within the scope of the permission granted to
use the insured vehicle is distinct from whether a "use" comes within
the coverage of the policy. Courts, in ascertaining whether the use
comes within the scope of the permission granted, typically apply one
of six widely accepted theories.27 For purposes of the latter issue, the
word "use" has generally been accorded its ordinary meaning, and
therefore it "is not confined to motion on the highway, but extends to
any activity involved in the utilization of the covered vehicle in the
manner intended or contemplated by the insured."28 Nevertheless, ju-
dicial interpretation of the term "use" as a condition precedent for om-
nibus coverage has not been uniform. A substantial number of
jurisdictions adhere to the view that "use" is not synonymous with "op-
erations" but rather embraces it.29 According to this view, as long as
the use is permitted it is immaterial how or by whom the vehicle was
being operated at the time of the accident.3 0 However, where the om-
nibus clause contains the phrase "actual operation," how and by whom
the vehicle was being operated at the time of the accident is
material.3 1
Many modern standardized automobile liability omnibus clauses
have substituted the phrase "actual use" for the word "use." Some au-
thorities take the position that the word "actual" does not add to or
subtract from the general meaning of "use."3 2 Other jurisdictions
27. See supra note 22.
28. See 8 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 23, at chap. 111, § 111.35, at 111-61 to 111-62.
29. See Continental Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 528 P.2d 430 (Alaska 1974); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Free-
man v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 455 (Conn. 1960); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 273 A.2d 261 (Del. 1970); American Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Blanton, 182 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Visintin v. Country Mut. Ins.
Co., 222 N.E.2d 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966); Grinnel Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 176 (Iowa 1997); Smith v. Insurance Co.,
161 So. 2d 903 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Taylor v. USF&G, 519 A.2d 182 (Me. 1986);
Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 258 A.2d 225 (Md. 1969); West Bend
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 384 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1986);
Weathers v. Royal Indem. Co., 577 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1979); Indemnity Ins. Co. of
N. Am. v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1960); United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas., 891 P.2d 538 (N.M.
1995); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 1994 Ohio App. Lexis 883;
Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hollopeter, 447 P.2d 391 (Or. 1968); Helwig v. Esterly,
208 A.2d 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965); Mullins v. Federal Dairy Co., 568 A-2d 759
(R.I. 1990); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 401 P.2d 205 (Wash.
1965); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 175 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va.
1970); Prisuda v. General Cas. Co. of Am., 74 N.W.2d 777 (Wis. 1956).
30. See supra note 29.
31. See Selected Risk Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 287 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Ct.
1972). But see Hemphill v. Home Ins. Co., 174 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).
32. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neat, 1970 Del. Super. LEXIS 466 (Del.
Super. Ct. March 20, 1970); Strickland v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 162 S.E.2d 421
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have accorded the phrase legal significance. In the latter jurisdictions
the phrase "actual use" means the particular use at the time of the
accident must be in accordance with the stated or intended use at the
time, place or purpose authorized by the insured.33 Thus, manner and
scope of the use at the time of the accident are important
considerations. 3 4
As observed earlier, the omnibus clause merely affords coverage to
the injured party and driver of the insured vehicle on the same terms
and subject to the same conditions, limitations, and exceptions appli-
cable to the named insured. Exclusions of certain drivers or persons
in automobile liability policies are permitted; however, exclusions
which dilute, condition, or otherwise conflict with statutory provisions
mandating the inclusion of an omnibus clause are construed as void
and unenforceable.35 For example, in Williams v. Forbes,36 the court
was asked to determine whether an exclusion illegally restricted cov-
erage for permissive users as required by the omnibus statute of Loui-
siana. Ronald Williams was the owner of a 1983 Oldsmobile Firenza
insured by Automotive Casualty Insurance Company. On June 6,
1992, Williams' car was involved in an accident while being driven by
Ronald Forbes. At the time of the accident, Williams was a passenger
in the car. Both Williams and Forbes were intoxicated. 37 Forbes was
also driving the car without a driver's license.3 S The insurer denied
(Ga. 1968); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Freeport Ins. Co., 173 N.E.2d 543 (fI1.
App. Ct. 1961); Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 47 So.
2d 133 (La. Ct. App. 1950); Fisher v. USF&G, 586 A.2d 783 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991); Arndt v. Davis, 183 Neb. 726, 163 N.W.2d 886 (1969); Metcalfv. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 471 (1964); Gronquist v.
Transit Cas. Co., 252 A.2d 232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969); Foley v. Tennes-
see Odin Ins. Co., 245 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. 1951); Thompson v. Ezzell, 379 P.2d 983
(Wash. 1963).
33. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Poe, 191 So. 2d 541 (Miss. 1966); Weathers
v. Royal Indem. Co., 577 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1979); McCollum v. Continental Ins.
Co., No. L-92-141, 1993 WL 382455 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1993); Gulla v. Reyn-
olds, 81 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Ryan v. Western Pac. Ins. Co., 408 P.2d
84 (Or. 1965); Maryland Cas. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 441 S.E.2d
338 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
34. See supra note 33.
35. See, e.g., Ogden v. USF&G, 933 P.2d 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 87 Cal. Rptr. 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Dotson, 913 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1996); Williams v. Forbes, 650 S.2d 337 (La.
Ct. App. 1995); Parkway Iron & Metal Co. v. New Jersey Mfg. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d
1352 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Mut.
Ins. Co., 203 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964); Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 355 P.2d 742 (Or. 1960); American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Southland Motors,
Inc., 302 S.E.2d 854 (S.C. 1983); Southside Distrib. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
189 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1972).
36. 650 So. 2d 337 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
37. See id. at 338.
38. See id.
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coverage on the basis of a provision in the policy requiring that a "cov-
ered person have a valid driver's license."3 9
The insurance policy in Williams v. Forbes provided:
A. INSURING AGREEMENT
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damages for which any cov-
ered person with a valid driver's license becomes legally responsible because
of an auto accident...
B. DEFINITIONS
1. "Covered person" as used in this section, is defined as a person having a
valid driver's license and who is...
b. a person using your covered auto with your permission.
4 0
The insurer argued that the valid driver's license requirement was
clearly stated in the policy and supported by LSA-R.S. 32:52 which
provided:
No person shall drive or operate any vehicle upon any highway within this
state unless and until he has been issued a license to do so as required by the
laws of this state nor shall any person permit or allow any other person to
drive or operate any vehicle owned or controlled by him upon highways of this
state unless and until such other person has been issued a license to so do as
required by the laws of this state.
4 1
According to the insurer, LSA-R.S. 32:52 reflects a public policy which
mandates that a person operating a motor vehicle must possess a
valid driver's license. Consequently, the policy limitation furthered
such public policy by requiring that a covered person have a driver's
license. 42 Despite statutory support for the insurer's position, the
court in Williams observed that the statutory omnibus clause require-
ment was to be broadly construed even when there is a conflict with
other policy terms or statutes. 43
The liberal interpretation accorded the omnibus clause in Williams
v. Forbes is not unique to Louisiana. In other jurisdictions where om-
nibus clauses are statutorily mandated, courts rely upon the same
broad public policy rationale in determining omnibus coverage. 44 Ac-
cording to this rationale, the legislature in enacting a mandatory om-
nibus clause law intended to protect the named insured, permissive
driver, and public at large from any harm accidentally caused by a
39. Id.
40. Id. at 338-39.
41. Id. at 339.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Principal Cas. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1306 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1992); American Home Assurance Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 464 A.2d
1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); Miller v. Lambert, 464 S.E.2d 582 (W. Va.
1995). But see United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Reilly, 858 P.2d 457 (Or. Ct. App.
1993)(holding that business exclusion does not violate mandatory omnibus clause
where it limits coverage in excess of that required by statute).
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motor vehicle.45 Therefore, any attempt by an insurer to restrict,
limit, or condition omnibus coverage is contrary to public policy.
In jurisdictions that lack mandatory omnibus clause statutes the
issue of whether an exclusion from omnibus coverage is valid is ascer-
tained quite differently. These jurisdictions use an ambiguity analy-
sis46 that accords the public policy inherent in all compulsory
insurance laws some but not decisive weight. For example, in Humble
Oil & Refining Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty C0.47 a vehicle
owned by McCord-Lane Company and insured by Lumbermens Mu-
tual was involved in an accident while driven by Virgil Buckelew.
Buckelew was an employee of Humble Oil & Refining Company.
Buckelew acquired possession of the vehicle from McCord-Lane in the
scope of his employment for purposes of servicing it. After the vehicle
was serviced at the Humble Oil service station and while it was being
returned to McCord-Lane it was involved in a collision with a motorcy-
cle driven by Charles Clayton. Clayton subsequently filed suit against
Humble Oil Company. Humble Oil gave notice of the lawsuit to Lum-
bermens Mutual and requested that Lumbermens defend it in the
case. Lumbermens refused and disclaimed liability on the ground
that Buckelew was not an insured under its policy.
The insurance policy in Humble Oil contained an automobile busi-
ness exclusion which excluded from omnibus coverage: "(v) Any person
while employed in or otherwise engaged in duties in connection with
an automobile business, other than an automobile business operated
by the named insured."48 "Automobile business" was defined in the
policy to mean "the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servic-
ing, storing or parking automobiles."4 9 The court in analyzing the ex-
clusion noted that damage caused to privately owned vehicles by
repairmen or their employees materially enhanced the risk assumed
by insurance companies.5 0 Therefore, insurers had a legitimate inter-
est, and the exclusion served a valid purpose. In light of the fact that
Texas law only mandated an omnibus clause in a liability policy certi-
fied as proof of financial responsibility, the court took the position that
the exclusion was valid if its language was clear and unambiguous.51
45. See supra note 18.
46. See infra Part IV.A
47. 490 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
48. Id. at 641.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 642.
51. See id. at 644; see generally United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Lail, 385 S.E.2d 424 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1989); Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 439 P.2d 760
(Mont. 1968); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 276 A.2d 386
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 308 N.E.2d 288 (IM. App. Ct. 1974).
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III. AUTO LIABILITY COVERAGE: INTENTIONAL
INJURY EXCLUSION
Expressed restrictions on the risks being transferred are universal
features of insurance contracts. These restrictions can be set forth in
the basic coverage provision or in other sections of the policy designed
specifically for that purpose. 52 In the context of automobile liability
insurance, the insuring agreement, which sets forth the basic state-
ment or description of coverage, also contains several limitations that
can serve as the basis for the denial of a claim. For example, the
model insuring agreement established above expressly limits coverage
to bodily injury and property damage for which any insured becomes
legally responsible because of an "auto accident." Another common
feature of the standardized automobile liability insuring agreement,
not found in the model agreement set forth above, is the further re-
striction that the auto accident "result from the use, maintenance, or
ownership of the vehicle." Most automobile liability coverage provi-
sions are followed by clauses that expressly exclude coverage for bod-
ily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the
direction of the insured.
Clauses excluding intentionally caused damage or injury need not
be expressly set out in the policy.5 3 Rather, public policy precludes an
individual from insuring against the economic consequences of his in-
tentional wrongdoing.5 4 Were the rule otherwise, the deterrence ef-
fect of financial accountability for wrongdoing would be lacking. The
rationale for the prohibition is to prevent moral hazard by not grant-
ing the insured a license to intentionally injure others with impunity
and still reap the benefit of insurance coverage. This rationale also
provides substantial support for the rule that insurance may not be
obtained to indemnify the insured against the consequences of his
criminal conduct.5 5
52. See supra note 3.
53. The advantages of an expressed exclusion for intentionally caused damage or in-
jury are (1) it provides the insured and courts with a more precise articulation of
the restriction; (2) it can be drafted to impose a more extensive limitation or re-
striction than the court would recognize in the absence of an explicit policy provi-
sion. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 5.4(d), at 518-19.
54. Legislative expression of this public policy can be found in the statutes of a num-
ber of states. The statute provides:
All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt
anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the per-
son or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negli-
gent, are against the policy of the law.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985); see MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-702 (1999);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 212 (West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-3 (Michie
1990).
55. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 5.4(d), at 519.
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The coverage language of the insuring agreement, in the absence of
an expressed exclusion, serves as the basis for the implied exclusion
for intentionally caused injury. In essence, if the injury was not the
result of an "occurrence"5 6 or "accident"5 7 - as the term(s) is set out
in the insuring agreement - then public policy precludes payment of
the proceeds because it was intended. "Accident" is generally defined,
in the absence of a definition in the policy, as an undesigned, sudden,
and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character
and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.58 By virtue of this
widely accepted definition, what constitutes an accident depends on
the perspective of either the injured victim or the insured. A majority
of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of whose perspective
should be decisive in determining whether an accident has occurred
have, in the absence of a provision in the policy, adopted the position
of the injured victim.59 When the perspective of the injured victim is
56. A number of policies use the term "occurrence" rather than "accident" in the in-
suring agreement. Policies that have adopted the term "occurrence" uniformly
define that term in the definition section of the policy to mean an "accident."
Consequently, the observations set out above apply regardless of the terminology
that is employed.
57. The typical motor vehicle liability coverage insuring agreement places two re-
strictions or limitations on coverage: (1) the legal liability of the insured for injury
or damage resulting from an accident; (2) which arises out of the use, mainte-
nance, or ownership of the insured vehicle. The second restriction is beyond the
scope of the primary thesis and will not be discussed in any detail in the text.
However, the majority of courts agree that in order for the accident to arise out of
the "use" of the vehicle there must be a causal relationship between the use of the
vehicle and the injury. The causal connection must be more than incidental, for-
tuitous, or but for. Furthermore, it is not enough that the vehicle is merely the
situs of the injury. See, e.g., Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972); Garrison v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 891 (Kan. 1995);
Casso v. United Cabs, Inc., 688 So. 2d 180 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Detroit Auto.
Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Higginbotham, 290 N.W.2d 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Tran-
samerica Ins. Group v. Union Pac. Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 156 (Wash. 1979).
58. See Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ariz. Aviation, Inc., 446 P.2d 490, 492
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); Prasad v. Allstate Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 992, 996 (Fla. 1994)
(McDonald, J., dissenting); Crawford Lab., Inc. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d
653, 658 (M. App. Ct. 1999); Pursell Constr., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co.,
596 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Iowa 1999); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Falley, 926 P.2d
664, 666 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); Primm v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 426 So. 2d
356, 359-60 (La. Ct. App. 1983); American States Ins. Co. v. Mathis, 974 S.W.2d
647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Casper v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 184
A.2d 247, 249 (Pa. 1962); Stoebner v. South Dakota Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
598 N.W.2d 557, 558 (S.D. 1999); Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 278 S.E.2d
809, 810 (Va. 1981).
59. See Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1169 (Del. 1990); Prasad
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 992, 996 (Fla. 1994) (McDonald, J., dissenting);
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 329 S.E.2d 136, 141 (Ga. 1985); Redden v.
Doe, 357 So. 2d 632, 634 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Dias v. Cinquegrana, 727 A.2d 198,
200 (R.I. 1999); Tomlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 290 N.W.2d 285,
288-89 (Wis. 1980). But see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499 (Wash.
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used, any injury not attributable to the victim is of accidental cause.
This view affords the broadest possible coverage. The mere inclusion
of an expressed intentional injury exclusion in a contract of insurance
does not alter the result that follows application of the victim's per-
spective. Consequently, many insurers sought to clarify and replace
the intentional injury exclusion by drafting liability coverage insuring
agreements to provide:
We will pay all sums the insured legally must pay as damages because of
bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by
accident and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered
vehicle.
DEFINITION
Accident includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions re-
sulting in bodily injury or property damage the insured neither expected or
intended. 6 0
Provisions of this nature limit the term "accident" for coverage pur-
poses to those actions of the insured that were neither expected nor
intended.61 This language also focuses the evaluation of whether the
injury-causing event was an accident on the perspective of the
insured. 62
The perspective of the insured approach provides coverage in a
much narrower range of circumstances than the perspective of the in-
jured victim approach. The perspective of the insured approach re-
lieves the liability insurer of its obligations under the policy if the
insured acted with specific intent to cause the injury in question.63
1992). See generally Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Potter, 330 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa
1983).
60. It is generally agreed that provisions containing language of this nature are the
equivalent of intentional tort exclusions. See Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel,
772 P.2d 6, 7-8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689,
690 (Ark. 1984); McCullough v. Central Fla. YMCA, 523 So. 2d 1208, 1208-09
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Roe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 376 S.E.2d 876, 876
(Ga. 1989); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Gardipey, 434 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 656, 355 N.W.2d
413, 418 (Minn. 1984); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reuter, 657 P.2d 1231, 1232
(Or. 1983); see generally Harpy v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 545 A.2d 718
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); County of Chemung v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 496
N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
61. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provi-
sion of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Ex-
pected by Insured, 31 A.L.R.4th 957, 972 (1984).
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Smith
v. Moran, 209 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965); Casso v. United Cabs, Inc., 688 So.
2d 180 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Putman v. Zeluff, 127 N.W.2d 374 (Mich. 1964); Sub-
scribers at the Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Kennison, 549 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977); Baldinger v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 183 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1962);
Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blackburn, 477 P.2d 62 (Okla. 1970); City of Burns
v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 434 P.2d 465 (Or. 1967); Alm v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 369 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 1962).
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Under this approach, it is not sufficient that the insured's intentional
act resulted in unintentional harm to a third party. Rather, the conse-
quences of the intended act must have been intended before the exclu-
sion is effective. 64 Another dimension of the perspective of the
insured approach used by some courts in assessing whether an acci-
dent has occurred is to infer intent to cause harm where the injury is
the natural and probable consequence of the insured's intentional
act.6 5 "This approach focuses on what a reasonable person would view
as the probable consequences of an act, rather than on a tortfeasor's
subjective state of mind."6 6
Assessing whether an accident has occurred from either dimension
of the perspective of the insured is difficult to comprehend in the ab-
stract. Consequently, Subscribers at the Automobile Club Inter-Insur-
ance Exchange v. Kennison6 7 provides a well-reasoned model of
practical application from which to view the principles of both dimen-
sions in operation. In Kennison, Brown, an insured under an automo-
bile insurance policy issued by Auto Club, was involved in a collision
with a car being driven by Kennison. At the time of the accident, Ken-
nison's car, with Kennison at the wheel, blocked Brown's car in the
traffic lane of a parking lot. Brown sounded his horn and twice orally
requested Kennison to move his car. After the second request Kenni-
son said, "[y]ou make me move."68 Brown then backed his car up a
few feet and "intentionally drove forward and 'rammed' into the left
rear of the Kennison car."6 9
Following the accident, Auto Club filed an action for a declaratory
judgment requesting that the court find that it was not obligated to
provide coverage because the injury was not the result of an accident
but had been caused deliberately. Auto Club further argued that the
intentional injury exclusion contained in the policy was controlling
64. See W. E. Merritt III, Annotation, Liability Insurance: Specific Exclusion of Lia-
bility for Injury Intentionally Caused by Insured, 2 A.L.R.3d 1238, § 2, at 1240-41
(1965); see generally KEETON & Wmiss, supra note 1, § 5.4(d)(2), at 520.
65. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 411 N.E.2d 1157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Falley, 926 P.2d 664 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); Sub-
scribers at the Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Kennison, 549 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977); Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800 (N.H. 1986); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wertz, 540 N.W.2d 636 (S.D. 1994).
66. KEETON & Wmiss, supra note 1, § 5.4(d)(2), at 521-22. Courts have developed
other approaches for determining whether an injury constitutes an accident. For
example, courts sometimes interpret the term "expected" in the phrase "neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured" to mean that if the
injury is substantially certain to be a consequence of the insured's action then
coverage is precluded. Id. at 523. The term "expected" is construed and defined
in such a way as to make it clear that "knowledgeable intent," as well as, "purpo-
sive intent" is sufficient to preclude coverage. Id.
67. 549 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
68. Id. at 589.
69. Id.
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and consequently justified its decision to deny coverage. The trial
court found that Brown's actions were wanton and reckless, but not
intentional. Auto Club, aggrieved by the trial court's decision,
appealed.
The appellate court in Kennison observed that whether injury is
caused intentionally within the meaning of an automobile liability in-
surance exclusion clause could be determined from either of two
dimensions. The first dimension, according to this court, requires an
evaluation of the facts, keeping in mind any evidence suggesting that
the insured acted with specific intent to cause injury. In the event
that credible evidence of specific intent to cause intentional injury was
absent, then the second dimension would become applicable. The sec-
ond dimension, the probable and natural consequence test, does not
totally depend upon the evidence. Rather, the court may rely upon its
own experience to determine whether the injuries were intended.
Where the injuries are the natural and probable consequences of the
insured's act, the injuries as well as the act are presumed to be inten-
tional.70 Relying on the fact that Brown admitted the collision was
intentional and because the injuries were the natural and probable
consequences of Brown's act, the appellate court concluded that the
injuries were intentional under both dimensions of the perspective of
the insured approach.
Courts, without regard to perspective, universally agree that the
public policy concerns inherent in the intentional injury exclusion do
not arise when the insured is being sued derivatively for the negligent
or intentional conduct of another.73 Consequently, where an insured
is sued for the intentional conduct of an agent or employee, the exclu-
sion is inapplicable. However, pursuant to the perspective of the in-
sured approach, if the insured directed or authorized the intentional
conduct, the exclusion is triggered and the insurer is relieved of its
obligation under the policy. 7 2
Liability insurance, in general, was initially designed to protect the
insured against economic losses arising out of his legal liability for any
fortuitous or accidental act. This observation was true in the case of
automobile liability insurance, and it continues to be so. However, be-
cause all states have enacted some form of compulsory motor vehicle
insurance laws, courts have been forced to incorporate the interests of
70. See id. at 591.
71. "'In general insurance to indemnify insured against his own violation of law is
void as against public policy; but insurance to indemnify him against the conse-
quences of a violation of law by others, or against his own negligence, or the negli-
gence of others, is valid.'" Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 53 N.W.2d 508, 512 (N.D.
1952) (quoting 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 242b(1945); see KEETON & WIDISS, supra
note 1, § 5.4(d)(5), at 527-529; Merritt III, supra note 64, § 5, at 1246.
72. See Edwards v. Akion, 279 S.E.2d 894 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Haser, 53 N.W.2d at
512.
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injured parties into the traditional view of liability insurance. Courts
evaluating the intentional injury exclusion from a statutory perspec-
tive are in essence attempting to ascertain whether the legislature in-
tended to abolish the exclusion when it enacted the pertinent statute.
Legislative history is especially useful in determining legislative in-
tent; however, state session laws rarely contain the detailed debates
or legislative history generally reflected in their federal counterparts.
Consequently, courts applying the statutory analysis rely principally
on their own perceptions of the purpose and objective of the legisla-
tion. A number of considerations influence these perceptions, includ-
ing (1) the existence of related legislation in which the exclusion was
or was not expressly abolished;73 (2) the societal benefit provided by
statute; (3) the interests protected by exclusion; and (4) whether the
benefits provided and interests protected are at odds with each other
in light of the mandatory nature of the insurance.
Compulsory insurance laws, especially motor vehicle financial re-
sponsibility statutes, have profoundly altered how courts view the in-
73. A substantial number of state legislatures have, as a part of their compulsory
motor vehicle statutes, enacted No-Fault Insurance Statutes which provide for
personal injury protection (PIP). These statutes basically state that the benefits
with respect to personal injury protection shall be provided without regard to,
and irrespective of, negligence, freedom from negligence, fault, or freedom from
fault on the part of any person. No-Fault Acts may be read as requiring coverage
for liability arising from intentional injury. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec,
514 A.2d 832 (N.J. 1986)(rejecting the reading of No-Fault Act in pari materia
with the compulsory liability insurance law and holding that No-Fault Act cannot
be read as support for the conclusion that intentional injury exclusion was void in
the context of the mandatory automobile liability coverage).
States which have enacted No-Fault laws include: Arkansas, see Aiuy. CODE
ANN. § 23-89-202 (Michie 1992); Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-706 (1999);
District of Columbia, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2104 (1981); Florida, see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.736 (West 2000)(insurer can exclude coverage to any person whose
injury was caused by their own intentional act); Hawaii, see HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 431:10C-103.5 (Supp. 1998); Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3107 (1992)(in-
surer can exclude coverage for any damages arising out of intentional act); Ken-
tucky, see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-040 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); Maryland, see
MD. CODE ANN., INs. § 19-505 (1997); Massachusetts, see MASs. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 90, § 34(M) (West 1999); Michigan, see MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 500.3105
(1993)(insurer can exclude coverage for intentional act); New Jersey, see N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-3.1, 39:6A-7 (West 1999)(insurer may exclude a person from
benefits where such person contributed to injury intentionally or in the commis-
sion of a misdemeanor, felony or seeking to avoid arrest); New York, see N.Y. INs.
LAw §§ 5101, 5103 (McKinney 1999)(insurer may exclude coverage to person who
intentionally causes own injury; injured as a result of operating vehicle while
intoxicated, under influence of drugs, committing felony, etc.); Oregon, see OR.
REv. STAT. § 742.520 (1997); Texas, see TEx. INs. CODE ANN. § 5.06-3 (West 2000);
Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-22-302, -309 (1999) (insurer may exclude a
person from benefits where such person contributed to injury intentionally or in
the commission of a misdemeanor, felony or seeking to avoid arrest); Washington,
see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.22.085 (West 1999).
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tentional injury exclusion. For example, in Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Roberts,74 a violent altercation between Mac Roberts
and Johnny Scippio occurred at the home of a mutual friend. Scippio
left the residence, and Roberts attempted to overtake him on foot.
When this proved unsuccessful, Roberts began a search for Scippio in
his car that was insured by Nationwide Mutual. When Roberts
sighted Scippio walking along a sidewalk, he deliberately drove his car
across the sidewalk and crushed Scippio. Scippio subsequently sued
Roberts and demanded that Nationwide indemnify its insured - Rob-
erts. Nationwide refused on the grounds that Roberts' conduct was
not an accident within the meaning of the liability insurance policy.
Nationwide further argued that Roberts' conduct violated the ex-
pressed intentional injury exclusion of the policy.
The court in Nationwide began its analysis by ascertaining
whether the liability policy in issue was a voluntary policy or one man-
dated by the Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act. Concluding
that the policy was one issued under the mandatory Safety Responsi-
bility Law the court observed:
The primary purpose of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is to
compensate innocent victims who have been injured by the negligence of fi-
nancially irresponsible motorists. Its purpose is not, like that of ordinary in-
surance, to save harmless the tortfeasor himself. Therefore, there is no reason
why the victim's right to recover from the insurance carrier should depend
upon whether the conduct of its insured was intentional or negligent. In order
to accomplish the objective of the law, the perspective here must be that of the
victim and not that of the aggressor for whom the law provides criminal penal-
ties calculated to minimize any profit he might derive from the insurance.
The victim's rights against the insurer are not derived through the insured as
in the case of voluntary insurance. They are statutory and become absolute
on the occurrence of an injury covered by the policy.7 5
This rationale has been variously stated and relied upon to void inten-
tional injury exclusions.76 However, the statutory analysis of the in-
tentional injury exclusion is very limited in nature. The first
limitation is that the analysis is applicable only to compulsory motor
74. 134 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1964).
75. Id. at 659.
76. The majority ofjurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held that finan-
cial responsibility laws that mandate liability coverage for "accidents" mandate
coverage for both intentional and unintentional torts. See, e.g., State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Tringali, 686 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1982); Hudson v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168 (Del. 1990); Martin v. Chicago Ins. Co., 361 S.E.2d 835
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Mosley v. West Am. Ins. Co., 743 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. Ct. App.
1987); Wheeler v. O'Connell, 9 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. 1937); Cannon v. Commerce
Ins. Co., 470 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Wolbarst, 57 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1948); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 237
S.E.2d 341 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Mumford, 382 S.E.2d 11 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); Dotts v. Taressa J.A., 390 S.E.2d
568 (W. Va. 1990).
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vehicle liability insurance.7 7 Second, some courts void the exclusion
only to the extent of the minimum amount of coverage required by the
statute.7 8 In such a jurisdiction, the intentional injury exclusion is
not automatically void as to coverage in excess of that required by
law.7 9 Rather, the effect of the exclusion on coverage in excess of that
required by law is determined on the basis of either the perspective of
the victim or insured approach.
The statutory analysis that disfavors the intentional injury exclu-
sion in the context of mandatory automobile liability insurance has
been extended to prohibitive use provisions that negate liability cover-
age in car rental agreements.8 0 The effect of this analysis has also
been to void prohibitive use or exculpatory provisions in car rental
agreements that nullify liability coverage.8 1 The statutory analysis in
this area has thus come full circle. Courts no longer focus solely on
the mandatory nature of the pertinent automobile liability insurance
statute, but they also buttress the analysis with judicial condemna-
tion of the insurance industry's practice of using private contracts to
set public penalties - a purely governmental responsibility. As the
court in Bass v. Horizon Assurance Co.82 put it:
The fixing of penalties for antisocial conduct is, in the first instance, a govern-
mental responsibility through legislative response. The Delaware General
Assembly has expressly determined the consequences which result from a con-
viction of driving while under the influence. These sanctions include the crim-
inal penalties of fine and/or imprisonment, and license revocation through
administrative action. We do not believe that the General Assembly, in addi-
tion to the imposition of these substantial penalties, also intended, by implica-
tion, to work a forfeiture of insurance protection purchased in conformity with
State law.8 3
Courts rejecting the statutory analysis have also done so on public
policy grounds.8 4 For example, in Williams v. Diggs8 5 the court was
77. See supra note 76.
78. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 134 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1964); Dotts
v. Taressa J.AL, 390 S.E.2d 568 (W. Va. 1990).
79. See supra note 76.
80. See, e.g., Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 39 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1934); Bass v.
Horizon Assurance Co., 562 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1989); Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.
v. Ricardo, 942 P.2d 507 (Haw. 1997); Hertz Corp. v. Garrott, 606 N.E.2d 219 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 643 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Long, 564 A.2d 937 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Ryan v. Knol-
ler, 695 A.2d 990 (R.I. 1997); City of Norfolk v. Ingram, 367 S.E.2d 725 (Va.
1988). But see Sutherland v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 593 (1st Cir.
1990)(not void); Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Carco Rentals, Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1143 (W.D. Ark. 1996)(not void); Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp.,
800 P.2d 831 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)(not void as against public policy).
81. See cases cited supra note 80.
82. 562 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1989).
83. Id. at 1197 (citations omitted).
84. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 779 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1985); Wil-
liams v. Diggs, 593 So. 2d 385 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 514
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confronted with a factual situation strikingly similar to Nationwide,
above. The plaintiff Eldridge Williams, defendant Lionel Diggs, and
others were playing cards at the home of a mutual friend. During the
game a quarrel erupted between Williams and Diggs. A third person
intervened and broke up the altercation. Thereafter, Diggs told Wil-
liams to wait until he returned.86 Diggs left the residence in his car.
Williams also left and began walking to his home located in a nearby
trailer park. As he was walking down a gravel lane inside the trailer
park, Williams heard a car approaching from behind. He turned, saw
Diggs' car, and continued walking, moving a little further over onto
the grass beside the lane. When Williams heard the car accelerate, he
turned around and saw the car coming straight at him. As he was
struck by the car and bounced against the windshield, Williams ob-
served that Diggs was driving the car. Diggs' car was insured with
Champion Insurance Company at the time of the incidence.
Williams subsequently filed suit against Diggs and his insurer.
The trial court rendered judgment against Diggs in the amount of
$17,703.85 plus costs and legal interest. The court also rendered judg-
ment in favor of the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association
(LIGA) which stood in the place of the insolvent Champion Insurance
Company. Williams appealed this aspect of the trial court's opinion.
The appellate court in Williams v. Diggs decided that the disposi-
tive issue was whether the Louisiana Compulsory Insurance Law re-
quired coverage in the minimum amount set forth in the statute,
regardless of whether the injury was intentionally caused within the
meaning of the expressed intentional injury exclusion in the automo-
bile liability policy. The court, after having examined the merits of
the case, observed:
It is true, as maintained by plaintiff, that the public policy of providing com-
pensation to victims injured by motor vehicles is a strong one and has been
applied by the courts of this state a number of times to strike down as invalid
certain exclusionary clauses in automobile liability policies. However, . .. an-
other well-established public policy must also be given consideration. This is
the policy against allowing a person to insure himself against his own inten-
tional acts causing injury to others. The rationale for this prohibition is to
forbid the extension to the insured of a license to intentionally injure others
with impunity and still fall under the coverage of his insurance policy... We
do not believe the Legislature intended to mandate coverage for such injuries
in view of the strong policy against allowing persons to insure themselves
against liability for injuries they intentionally inflict.8 7
A.2d 832 (N.J. 1986); Snyder v. Nelson, 564 P.2d 681 (Or. 1977); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wertz, 540 N.W.2d 636 (S.D. 1995); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co., 286 S.E.2d 225 (Va. 1982).
85. 593 So. 2d 385 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
86. See id. at 385.
87. Id. at 387 (citations omitted).
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IV. RENTAL CAR: COLLISION DAMAGE WAIVER
PROHIBITIVE USE EXCLUSIONS
Automobile rental and lease agreements uniformly provide lessees
with a number of collision responsibility alternatives. Pursuant to
these alternatives, lessee may elect to retain responsibility for colli-
sion damage up to optional limits expressly set out in the policy or
waive collision damage coverage altogether.8 S The collision damage
waiver, unlike the other alternatives, provides lessees with complete
collision protection or the broadest collision protection afforded by the
rental agreement. In exchange for this protection, however, car rental
agreements conspicuously provide that the collision damage waiver is
not insurance.8 9 Despite the fact that collision damage waivers may
not constitute insurance, courts have relied exclusively on insurance
contract principles in construing these provisions. For example, in
Davis v. M.L. G. Corp.9 0 the court, adopting the reasonable expectation
of the insured doctrine as articulated by Professor Keeton in Insur-
ance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,91 explained:
This article concerns true insurance contracts rather than damage waiver pro-
visions of the type at issue in this case. However, because the agreement in
this case was, like most insurance contracts, a "form" contract prepared by the
lessor and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, "we feel that the appropriate
interpretive principles are those normally applicable to insurance
contracts."
9 2
88. The collision damage responsibility chosen by the lessee affects the rental rate of
the leased vehicle. Car rental companies generally charge an additional daily fee
in response to the collision responsibility option chosen by the lessee.
89. Courts generally agree that the act of renting a car creates a bailment between
the leasing company (bailor) and the customer (bailee). At common law the
bailee was responsible for any damage to the bailed property. Under this rule the
customer was legally responsible for damage to the rented vehicle. However, par-
ties to a bailment contract are free to alter the common law obligations as long as
their agreement does not violate public policy. Consequently, exercise of the colli-
sion damage waiver option constitutes a change in the bailment agreement and
places responsibility for damage to the vehicle on the leasing company. See 14
BLASHFIELD AUTOMOBiLE LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 475.13 & 476.21 (Frederick D.
Lewis ed., 3d ed. 1969).
The majority of courts which have addressed this issue agree that the collision
damage waiver constitutes a change in the contract of bailment and not insur-
ance. See Chabraja v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 549 N.E.2d 872 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989); Hearty v. Harris, 574 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1991); Hertz Corp. v. Corcoran, 520
N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. 1987). But see Grand Rent A Car Corp. v. 20th Century
Ins. Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)(collision damage waiver is insur-
ance); Passamone v. Travelers Indem. Co., 882 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1994)(collision
damage waiver is insurance).
90. 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986).
91. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions 83
HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970).
92. Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d at 989 n.4 (citing Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v.
Quigley, 373 A.2d 810 (R.I. 1977)).
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Car rental agreements also condition the protection afforded by the
collision damage waiver upon the lessee's compliance with the use re-
strictions or prohibitive use provisions of the contract. Use restric-
tions may vary in terms of the number of prohibitions provided.
However, restrictive uses common to car rental contracts include
prohibitions against (1) intentionally, willfully or wantonly damaging
vehicle; (2) using vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of
drugs or other substances which impair driving ability; (3) using vehi-
cle in a speed contest or training activity; (4) using vehicle to commit a
crime; (5) allowing vehicle to be operated by an unlicensed or unautho-
rized person; (6) using vehicle for hire. Collision coverage is limited in
the agreement so as not to apply if there is a violation of any of the
restrictions.
Despite maybe not being insurance,9 3 the purpose of collision dam-
age coverage in car rental agreements is the same as that in automo-
bile collision coverage. Collision coverage is merely one form of
automobile property insurance coverage. 94 Collision coverage differs
sufficiently from automobile liability insurance in that neither the
principles derived from nor the concerns underlying automobile liabil-
ity insurance are applicable to coverage disputes under automobile
property protection.9 5 This is due, in large part, to the fact that "the
strong public policy favoring liability insurance coverage to protect the
public at large is generally absent from the analysis in the context of
property coverages." 96 In other words, collision coverage disputes pri-
marily involve issues and interests that, when compared to liability
insurance disputes, are uniquely private in nature.
The model "Coverage For Damage To Your Auto" insuring agree-
ment provides:
A. We will pay for direct and accidental loss to "your Covered auto" or any
"non-owned auto," including equipment, minus any applicable deductible
shown in the Declarations. We will pay for loss to "your covered auto" caused
by:
Although the subject of this contract was the lease of an automobile, a
significant part of the contract concerned insurance.... For these rea-
sons, and because the contract was, like most insurance contracts, a
"form" contract that had many clauses prepared by the insurer and of-
fered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, we feel that the appropriate interpre-
tive principles are those normally applicable to insurance contracts.
Quigley, 373 A.2d at 812.
93. See supra note 89.
94. Comprehensive or "other than collision coverage" is the other form of automobile
property insurance common to automobile insurance. Both coverages, if pur-
chased, are contained in the section of the policy entitled "Coverage For Damage
To Your Auto." For a detailed discussion of comprehensive coverage in the con-
text of the primary thesis, see infra Section V.
95. See 11 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 23, chap. 156, § 156:4, at 156-10.
96. Id.
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1. Other than "collision" only if the Declaration indicates that Other Than
Collision Coverage is provided for that auto.
2. "Collision" only if the Declarations indicate that Collision Coverage is pro-
vided for that auto ....
B. "Collision" means the upset of "your covered auto" or its impact with an-
other vehicle or object. 97
The above coverage provides comprehensive and collision protection
solely against "direct and accidental losses to your covered auto or any
non-owned auto, including its equipment."9 8 "Direct" refers to the
causal relationship and means immediate or proximate - not re-
mote.99 "Accidental" usually means sudden and unexpected from the
insured's standpoint.100
Courts ascertaining the validity of prohibitive use restrictions in
the context of collision damage waivers have relied exclusively upon
three variance principles. Those principles are (1) ambiguity; (2) un-
conscionability; and (3) reasonable expectations of the insured.
A. AmbiguityiOi
"Ambiguity is one of the oldest and most implemented variance
principles."' 0 2 The rule of ambiguity is simply that an ambiguity in
an insurance policy will be construed against its drafter and in favor
of the non-drafting party.lO3 A contract is ambiguous when a word,
phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible to, more than
one reasonable interpretation when the policy is read as a whole.i0 4
Ambiguity in an insurance contract can arise from three sources: (1)
97. PERSONAL AuTo POLICY, supra note 9.
98. PERSONAL AuTo POLICY, supra note 9.
99. See PRAHL, supra note 15, at 139; 11 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 23, chap. 156,
§ 156:21, at 156-36.
100. See PlAHL, supra note 15, at 139; 11 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 23, chap. 156,
§ 156:20, at 156-35; see generally supra section III.
101. Footnotes 101-16 and accompanying text were substantially reprinted from
Johnny Parker, Replacement Cost Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34 WAKE FOREsT L.
REV. 295, 328-31 (1999).
102. KEETON & Wmiss, supra note 1, § 6.3, at 628.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. General Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569,
572 (2d Cir. 1991)(applying New York substantive law); Federated Guar. Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunn, 439 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); Delgado v. Heritage Life
Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 (Ct. App. 1984); National Cas. Co. v. Great
Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741, 746 (Colo. 1992); Murr v. Selag Corp., 747
P.2d 1302, 1310 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Coleman,
754 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Union Ins. Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc., 247
Neb. 696, 529 N.W.2d 773, 776 (1995); Graber v. Engstrom, 384 N.W.2d 307, 309
(N.D. 1986); Weisman v. Green Tree Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996); Greendig v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 891 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1994); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.
1951); Baehmer v. Viking Ins. Co., 827 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992);
Pilling v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 500 S.E.2d 870, 872 (W. Va. 1997).
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inconsistent policy provisions; 0 5 (2) policy organization;1 0 6 (3) ambig-
uous language.1O7 Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of
law.1 0 8 The determination that an ambiguity exists as a result of in-
consistent policy provisions or poor policy organization requires little
more than an examination of the entire policy and application of the
controlling rule.10 9 However, determining whether policy language is
ambiguous requires the application of a detailed legal analysis.
The interpretation of an insurance policy is primarily the responsi-
bility of the court. In performance of this responsibility, courts are
guided by the most fundamental principle of contract interpretation,
that "[a]n insurance contract should be construed to carry out the
intention of the parties, and that intention should be ascertained,
if possible, from the language in the policy alone."' 10 This is the
105. See, e.g., Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 325 So. 2d 143, 151 (Ala.
1975); Home Indem. Co. v. City of Marianna, 761 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ark. 1988);
Coit v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 168 P.2d 163, 169 (Cal. 1946); Imperial
Cas. & Indem. Co. v. State, 714 A.2d 1230, 1237 (Conn. 1998); Reliance Life Ins.
Co. v. Lynch, 197 So. 723, 727-28 (Fla. 1940)(Brown, J., dissenting); Davis v.
United Am. Life Ins. Co., 111 S.E.2d 488, 492 (Ga. 1959); National Discount
Shoes, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 424 N.E.2d 1166, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Kan. 1998); Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. DeLa-
Garza, 444 N.W.2d 803, 805-06 (Mich. 1989); Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard
Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Minn. 1986); Oleson v. Farmers Ins. Group, 605
P.2d 166, 169 (Mont. 1980); American Shops, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 97 A.2d
513, 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1953); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. In-
gram, 271 S.E.2d 46, 53 (N.C. 1980); C.P.A. Co. v. Jones, 263 P.2d 731, 735 (Okla.
1953); Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977); Marson
Coal Co. v. Insurance Co., 210 S.E.2d 747, 750 (W. Va. 1974).
106. See, e.g., McRaven v. F-Stop Photo Labs, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 365 A.2d 744, 746 (N.H.
1976).
107. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1; see, e.g., Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651
F.2d 838, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1981); Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 1979).
108. See Columbia Heights, 275 N.W.2d at 34.
109. See, e.g., Davis, 111 S.E.2d at 492; Rusthoven, 387 N.W.2d at 644-45; Atwood, 365
A.2d at 746-47.
110. Wheeler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 9, 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). For expression
of similar views, see Hall v. American Indem. Group, 648 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala.
1994); Home Indem. Co. v. Wilson, 489 P.2d 244, 247 (Ariz. 1971); Floyd v. Otter
Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 742 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); Bay Cities
Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1271 (Cal.
1993); Hitz v. Allied Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 195 A.2d 446, 448 (Conn. Cir. Ct.
1963); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 152, 155-56
(Del. 1996); State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deni Assocs., Inc., 678 So. 2d 397,
400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 692 P.2d 337, 341
(Idaho 1984); Willison v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 690 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 504 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987), rev'd, 517 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1988); Loyd v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance
Co., 518 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa 1994); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Old Hickory
Cas. Ins. Co., 810 P.2d 283, 286 (Kan. 1991); Benton v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 550
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supreme rule and all other rules of construction are subservient to
it.111
Ambiguity, no matter the source, "should first be resolved by giv-
ing effect to the intention of the parties."11 2 If the intention of the
parties can be ascertained, the court should not construe the policy in
favor of either of the parties, but should give effect to the parties' mu-
tual intentions. 1 3
If an ambiguity exists as a result of a reading of the policy lan-
guage, the court may resolve the ambiguity by resorting to extrinsic
evidence.114 The insurer must prove not only that the words and ex-
So. 2d 859, 860 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Maine Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 665 A.2d 671, 675 (Me. 1995); JMP Assocs., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 693 A.2d 832, 834 (Md. 1997); Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Minn. 1978); Peterson v. Conti-
nental Boiler Works, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Mo. 1990); Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
v. Bierschenk, 250 Neb. 146, 548 N.W.2d 322, 324 (1996); Caruso v. John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 A.2d 359, 360 (N.J. 1948); Loya v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 888 P.2d 447, 451 (N.M. 1994); Hickman v. Saunders, 645 N.Y.S.2d 49,
50 (1996); Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Landmark, 547 N.W.2d 527, 532
(N.D. 1996).
111. See 13 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE
§ 7385 (1976 & Supp. 1999).
112. Board of County Comm'rs v. Colorado Counties Cas. & Property Pool, 888 P.2d
352, 355 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
113. See id.; supra note 110 and accompanying text.
114. Both patent and latent ambiguities may arise from the language used in insur-
ance policies. See C. & A. Constr. Co. v. Benning Constr. Co., 509 S.W.2d 302,
303 (Ark. 1974); North Am. Philips Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., Co., No. 88C-JA-
155, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 356, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 1995); Hall v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 295 N.W. 204, 206 (Mich.
1940); Koplin v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 44 A.2d 877, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995).
A patent ambiguity exists when the language on its face is capable of more
than a single interpretation and "arises from the use of defective, obscure, or in-
sensible language." Crown Mgmt. Corp. v. Goodman, 452 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984). "Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible if the ambiguity is patent,
because such evidence would, in effect, allow the court to rewrite the contract for
the parties by supplying information the parties themselves did not choose to
include." Id. A latent ambiguity exists when patently unambiguous language
becomes ambiguous when applied. "A latent ambiguity... is said to exist where
a contract fails to specify the rights or duties of the parties in certain situations
and extrinsic evidence is necessary for interpretation or a choice between two
possible meanings." Id.
Although there appears to be some divergence of opinion as to when pa-
rol evidence is properly admitted because of the latent ambiguity-pat-
ent ambiguity dichotomy, the distinction between the type of ambiguity
involved is one of form over substance. The growing and better reasoned
trend of authority indicates that the introduction of parol evidence to
probe the true intent of the parties is proper, irrespective of any techni-
cal classification of the type of ambiguity present.
Id. (quoting Royal Continental Hotels, Inc. v. Broward Vending, Inc., 404 So. 2d
782, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
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pressions used in the insurance contract are susceptible to the con-
struction sought, but that it is the only reasonable construction that
may fairly be placed on them.1 1 5 Courts, in assessing whether the
insurer's interpretation of the policy is the only reasonable one, are
free to look beyond the language of the policy. Relevant considera-
tions may include: (1) the ordinary meaning of the words in question;
(2) how reasonable persons would construe the words in question; (3)
availability of clearer language; and (4) the nature, type, and purpose
of the insurance in question.'1 6 If the court determines that the words
and expressions are susceptible to more than one meaning and that
the insured's construction was reasonable, the rule of ambiguity is
applied.1 1 7
The seminal decision applying the principle of ambiguity to a coli-
sion insurance dispute is Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley. 1 8 The
plaintiff Elliott Leases Cars leased an automobile to John Quigley, in
his capacity as president of Rhode Island Buckle, Inc. The defendant
was Mr. Quigley's wife. While driving the car with her husband's per-
mission, defendant was involved in an accident. Defendant's negli-
gence was the cause of the accident. Elliott Leases Cars brought suit
against defendant for the total cost of repairing the car. Mrs. Quigley
denied liability on the ground that the lease agreement obligated
plaintiff to provide collision insurance for her benefit. The trial court
held for plaintiff and defendant appealed.
The contractual relationship between the parties was embodied in
two documents: a lease agreement and a document entitled "Automo-
bile Leasing Order." Both documents were standard forms prepared
by Elliott. The "Automobile Leasing Order" was a single printed page
which provided, among other things, that plaintiff would pay for "AC-
CIDENT REPAIRS - 100/deduct-Due to Collision (or Upset) per Ac-
cident."11 9 Mrs. Quigley contended that this provision obligated
defendant to provide collision insurance without regard to negligence.
Plaintiff in response argued that the lease agreement explicitly ne-
gated any obligation to provide insurance for accidents caused by the
negligence of the operator of the leased vehicle. The lease agreement
115. See Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981). "The
insurer is 'obliged to show (1) that it would be unreasonable for the average man
reading the policy to [construe it as the insured does] and (2) that its own con-
struction was the only one that fairly could be placed on the policy.'" Id. (quoting
Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 183 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y. 1962)).
116. See, e.g., Vargas, 651 F.2d at 840-42 (using a number of interpretive techniques
to analyze the contract in question); Jacobs v. Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 551
N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)(explaining various considerations for the
court if faced with a potential ambiguity).
117. See supra note 116.
118. 373 A.2d 810 (R.I. 1977).
119. Id. at 811.
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was a two-page document containing twenty-eight provisions. Clause
2 of the agreement provided in part that:
Lessee further agrees... if the loss is the result of any violation of the terms
or conditions of this agreement or the result of careless, reckless or abusive
handling of the automobile.... Lessee shall be liable for the full amount of
the loss without regard to the limitation of $100.00 .... 120
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in addressing the merits of the
case, noted that it could not look to only one or the other of the two
documents.12 1 Rather, according to the court, both documents to-
gether formed the contract between the parties.1 2 2
The lease agreement clearly and unequivocally purported to ex-
clude negligently caused accidents from the collision coverage prom-
ised in the "Automobile Leasing Order." Consequently, ambiguity
arose as a result of inconsistent provisions in the contract. 123 Despite
this fact, the court, rather than merely applying the rule of ambiguity
to the facts of the case,12 4 engaged in the detailed analysis normally
applied where the source of the ambiguity is unclear or equivocal lan-
guage.12 5 This analysis allowed the court not only to consider how an
ordinary person or purchaser would interpret the collision insurance
provision but also the purpose and nature of collision coverage.' 2 6
The expanded analysis used by the court in Quigley, while certainly
unnecessary in light of the source of the ambiguity,127 reflects a judi-
120. Id. at 811-12.
121. See id. at 811.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 812-13.
124. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
126. These considerations led the court to observe that:
In this case, the leasing order provided that plaintiff would pay for "acci-
dent repairs" caused by collision or upset, subject to a $100 deductible.
The ordinary reader would not assume that an unqualified promise of
this nature only covered accidents not caused by the negligence of the
operator of the automobile. Indeed just the opposite is true. Collision
insurance is generally understood to cover whatever accidents occur, re-
gardless of the negligence of the operator. An exclusion which limits cov-
erage to nonnegligent accidents significantly reduces the scope of the
insurance. Not only does it reduce the total number of accidents covered,
but it eliminates coverage in precisely those cases in which it is most
needed - that is, where there may be no negligent tortfeasor from
whom the insured may recover. The ordinary reader of the leasing order
provision would therefore assume that collision insurance was provided
without regard to negligence.
Quigley, 373 A.2d at 812.
127. Conflicting interpretations or opposite conclusions from different jurisdictions re-
garding the legal effect or meaning of policy language or provisions can also give
rise to ambiguity. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 782 P.2d 727,
732 (Ariz. 1989); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
549 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ark. 1977); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476
N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich. 1991); Maddox v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 280
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cial concern for fairness in the interpretation and enforcement of in-
surance contracts. In essence, the court's use of the expanded analysis
suggests that interpretations of collision coverage are not totally de-
void of policy considerations.
B. Unconscionability 28
Courts are ordinarily only concerned with the legality of con-
tracts. 129 Consequently, a contract containing clear and unambiguous
language that is not the result of fraud, duress, undue influence, or
mistake is usually enforced according to its terms. Nevertheless,
courts are not powerless, and if the circumstances of the case require,
they may ignore this rule and examine the wisdom and fairness of a
contract. A court may refuse to enforce a contract or any clause con-
tained therein if it determines that the contract or clause was uncon-
scionable at the time it was made.13o
An unconscionable contract is one that no person "in his senses and
not under delusion would make... and [that] no honest and fair man
would accept." 13 1 The doctrine of unconscionability allows the court to
rule directly on the unconscionability of the contract, or clause
therein, without having "to avoid unconscionable results by interpre-
tation."132 A contract is unconscionable if two conditions exist: (1) one
of the parties to the contract lacks a meaningful choice about whether
S.E.2d 907, 910 (N.C. 1981); Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 355 P.2d
742, 746-47 (Or. 1960). But see ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property
and Cas. Ins. Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, (1993) (declining to follow view that an
ambiguity arises merely because there is conflicting case law); FDIC v. American
Cas. Co., 528 N.W.2d 605, 608 (Iowa 1995)(refusing to follow view that an ambi-
guity arises merely because there is conflicting case authority); Motorists Mut.
Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996)(holding that con-
flicting judicial interpretation is a factor that warrants consideration in assessing
the existence of an ambiguity, but it is in no way dispositive); Sullins v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 624 (Md. 1995)(stating that conflicting judicial interpreta-
tion is a factor that warrants consideration in assessing the existence of an ambi-
guity, but is in no way dispositive); Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 315 S.W.2d
239, 242 (Tenn. 1958)(recognizing that insurance policies will not be automati-
cally construed against the insurer where judicial construction is clear); Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1997)(declining to
follow view that an ambiguity arises merely because there is conflicting case
authority).
128. Footnotes 129-33 and accompanying text were substantially reprinted from
Johnny Parker, Replacement Cost Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 295, 326 (1999).
129. See Joseph v. Donover Co., 261 F.2d 812, 824 (9th Cir. 1958).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
131. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889). Similarly, see Lloyd v. Service
Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735, 739 (Ala. 1984) and Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d
1014, 1020 (Okla. 1976).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981).
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to accept the provision in question; (2) the challenged provision unrea-
sonably favors the other party.133
The doctrine of unconscionability counteracts two forms of abuses.
The first type relates to deficiencies in the contract formation process.
The second type of abuse involves the ramifications of enforcing bla-
tantly unfair contract terms. In other words, unconscionability has
both a procedural and substantive component. 134 More specifically,
procedural unconscionability is concerned with improprieties that oc-
curred during the formation of the contract, while substantive uncon-
scionability involves those cases where a clause or term in a contract
is one-sided or oppressive.13 5
In Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez3 6 the court tested the
bounds of the doctrine of unconscionability in the context of a collision
damage waiver provision. In Val Preda, defendant leased a car from
plaintiff. Defendant declined the collision damage waiver and ac-
cepted collision responsibility in the amount of $600. However, a pro-
vision in the agreement provided that renter would be liable for all
collision damage to the leased vehicle if damage occurred during a vio-
lation of any of the prohibitive uses. Defendant fell asleep while driv-
ing the leased vehicle, collided with a telephone pole, and wrecked the
car. One of the prohibitive use provisions provided that the vehicle
not be used by anyone not sufficiently alert to drive. Defendant paid
$600 to plaintiff, but he refused to pay for the remaining damage.
The appellate court in Val Preda rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the rental agreement was ambiguous.137 Nevertheless, in-
133. See Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d 713, 716 (Ala. 1989); Rodgers
v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Okla. 1988); Koval v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 531 A.2d 487, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); REsTATEi T (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
134. See Truta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 816 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987); Frank's Maint. & Eng'g, Inc. v. CAL Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 409-10
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706
P.2d 1028, 1040-43 (Utah 1985); Planet Ins. Co. v. Wong, 877 P.2d 198, 202
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Hesco Constr., Inc., 614
P.2d 1302, 1307 n.10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
135. See supra note 134.
Factors to be considered are all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction including the manner in which the contract was entered
into, whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the
terms of the contract, and whether important terms were hidden in a
maze of fine print; both the conspicuousness of the clause and the negoti-
ations relating to it are important, albeit not conclusive factors in deter-
mining the issue of [procedural] unconscionability.
Frank's Maint. & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 410 (IMi. App.
Ct. 1980). "Substantive unconscionability concerns the question whether the
terms themselves are commercially reasonable." Id.
136. 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987).
137. See id. at 649.
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spired by equitable considerations, the court proceeded to determine
whether enforcing the contract would be unconscionable.138 The con-
tract seemingly limited defendant's collision damage liability to $600.
Furthermore, the extensive list of prohibitions in effect made the
renter liable for virtually all damage caused by the renter. However,
these results could be ascertained from reading and digesting the en-
tire contract. Following these findings the court in Val Preda, after
also concluding that the factors relevant to unconscionability in the
formation of a contract were not present,13 9 concluded that the terms
of the contract were unconscionable and substantively unfair.14o This
finding was based on the fact that the renter would have difficulty in
comprehending the consequences of the substantial exceptions, and
if the numerous exceptions were given effect, the renter would be liable for
damage caused by virtually every type of driver error, including making an
illegal left-hand turn.... because that is operating the vehicle in an 'unlawful
manner'... driving while intoxicated,... or by falling asleep... The excep-
tions swallow the protection.141
As observed in the discussion of ambiguity, the judicial analysis of un-
conscionability also supports the conclusion that policy considerations
are present in the analysis of collision insurance.
C. Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
The intellectual foundation of the reasonable expectations doctrine
was first articulated as an overarching set of principles used to assist
in explaining the results of disparate insurance law decisions that ap-
peared to be based on a number of different rationales.142 Since that
time courts throughout the country have attempted to shape these
principles into definitive legal rules. This effort has led to the develop-
ment and recognition of different versions of the doctrine.14 3
138. See id. The Val Preda court, citing Trustees of Net Realty Holding Trust v. AVCO
Financial Serv. of Barre, Inc., 476 A.2d 530, 533 (Vt. 1984), observed, "[The] logic
of an agreement, without more, is not a proper concern for the court in the ab-
sence of public policy considerations, fraud, overreaching, and similar concerns."
Id. at 649.
139. See Val Preda at 652; see also Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo.
1986)(discussing procedural unconscionability in the formation of a rental car col-
lision damage waiver agreement).
140. See Val Preda, 540 A.2d at 652.
141. Id.
142. See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance
Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 825 (1990)(citing Robert E. Keeton,
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961
(1970)).
143. Judicial attempts at defining the contours of the reasonable expectations doctrine
have only increased the uncertainty regarding the theoretical underpinnings,
scope, and details of application of the doctrine. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note
142, at 824, 838; Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18
CONN. L. REV. 323, 345, 370-71 (1986).
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These versions and the rules applicable thereto have been classi-
fied, at least by one commentator, as (1) construction of an ambiguous
term in the insurance contract to satisfy the insured's reasonable ex-
pectations; (2) refusal to enforce the "fine print" of an insurance con-
tract because it limits more prominent provisions giving rise to the
insured's expectation; (3) refusal to enforce an insurance contract pro-
vision when it would frustrate the reasonable expectations of coverage
created by the insurer outside of the contract.144 Decisional law sug-
gests that further refinement of these versions would be appropriate.
Accordingly, case law suggests that version (2) is a variant of version
(1) - ambiguity - and not a separate approach to which entirely dis-
tinct rules are applicable.1 4 5 Whether one accepts the existence of two
or three versions of the reasonable expectations doctrine does not
change the fact that only two competing decisional approaches to in-
terpreting insurance contracts have evolved: (1) the "traditional" or
"formalist" approach; (2) the "functional" or "reasonable expectation
approach."14 6
144. See Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1461, 1467 (1989).
145. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
146. See Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1159 (Or. 1991)(Unis, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Unis, dissenting, explained the similarities and distinctions be-
tween these interpretative approaches:
Under the "traditional" or "formalist" approach, the court looks to the
"four corners" of the insurance policy and interprets it by applying rules
applicable to all contracts in general. The insured is held to have read
and to have understood the clear language of the policy. Extrinsic evi-
dence relating to the insurance contract may be examined for the pur-
pose of determining the parties' intention to an objective analysis of the
"four corners" of the contract.
The rationale behind the "formalist" approach is that contracts of in-
surance rest upon and are controlled by the same principles of law that
apply to other contracts, and the parties to an insurance contract may
provide such provisions as they deem proper as long as the contract does
not contravene law or public policy (citations omitted).
The competing approach to insurance contract interpretation - the
"functional" or "reasonable expectation" approach - is that the policy-
holder's reasonable expectations to coverage under the insurance policy
should be honored even though those expectations vary from the policy
provisions.
The "functional" or 'reasonable expectation" approach is supported
by the notion that insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts negoti-
ated by parties with roughly equal bargaining strength. Rather, they
are largely contracts of adhesion, where the insurance company, in pre-
paring a standardized printed form, has the superior bargaining posi-
tion, and the insured has to accept such a policy on a "take-it-or-leave-it"
basis if the insured wants any form of insurance protection.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 211 (1981), "[rlepudiates the
'four-corners' ['traditional' or 'formalist'] approach to contract interpreta-
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Despite the vast uncertainty that exists with regard to the scope
and details of application of the reasonable expectations doctrine,
some widely accepted definitive rules have developed pertaining to
each version. The more popular or narrow version of the doctrine, fol-
lowed in a majority of jurisdictions, treats the reasonable expectation
doctrine as a corollary to the rule of ambiguity.14 7 In this context, the
doctrine is viewed as a tool of contract interpretation and is applicable
only if an ambiguity is found to exist in the policy.148 The fact that an
insurance policy is a contract of adhesion is not reason enough, in and
of itself, to apply the doctrine.149 Rather, the objectively reasonable
expectation of an insured is uniformly honored even though painstak-
ing study of the policy provisions have negated those expectation
when (1) the policy is ambiguous; (2) the policy contains exclusions
which are masked by technical or obscure language; or (3) exclusions
are hidden in policy provisions.o50 Either of these circumstances can
tion in the standardized agreement setting and in effect approves a doc-
trine of 'reasonable expectations.'"
A growing number of courts use the "functional" approach to protect
the "reasonable expectations" of the insured policyholder from possible
denial of coverage that might result under the "traditional" or "formal-
ist" contractual analysis of an insurance policy.
There is no disagreement between the "formalist" and the "func-
tional" approaches whenever the insurance policy is ambiguous or sus-
ceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations....
Id. at 1159-61 (citations omitted).
147. See, e.g., Morris v. Atlas Assurance Co., 204 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Derrickson v. American Nat'l. Fire Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 1113 (Del. 1988); Penalosa
Coop. Exch. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 1196 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Si-
mon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1986); Louisiana Ins. Guar.
Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759 (La. 1994); Jefferson Ins. Co. v.
City of Holyoke, 503 N.E.2d 474 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)(discussing the split among
courts as to whether application of reasonable expectations doctrine requires an
ambiguity); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 475 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1991); Hubred v.
Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1989); Rodriguez v. General Accident
Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1991); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Young, 832
P.2d 376 (Nev. 1992); Max True Plastering Co. v. USF & G, 912 P.2d 861 (Okla.
1996). But see, e.g., Sharpe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS
441 (Mass. 1996)(holding that ambiguity must exist in order to apply reasonable
expectations doctrine); Farmers Ins. Exch., 832 P.2d at 378-79; Rummel v. Lex-
ington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970 (N.M. 1997); Employer Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pires, 723
A.2d 295 (R.I. 1999); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139 (Wash.
1984); Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998); Krem-
ers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1984).
148. See supra note 147.
149. See Rahdert, supra note 143, at 338; supra note 147; see also Darner Motor Sales,
Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 395 (Ariz. 1984)(holding
that "most insureds develop a 'reasonable expectation' that every loss will be cov-
ered by their policy"); Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798,
803 & n.6 (Utah 1992)(holding that "form contracts are essential to the economic
viability of the insurance industry").
150. See supra note 147.
[Vol. 79:75
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
be construed to give rise to a latent or patent ambiguity.15 1 This ver-
sion of the doctrine is in keeping with the "traditional" or "formalist"
approach to contract interpretation.1 5 2
The second or broad version of the doctrine does not require a find-
ing of ambiguity as a condition precedent to application of the reason-
able expectations of the insured doctrine.1S3 The fact that an
insurance policy is a contract of adhesion is enough to trigger applica-
tion. The court is justified in rewriting an otherwise clear and unam-
biguous policy if (1) the insurer knew or should have known of the
insured's expectation; (2) the insurer created or helped to create those
expectations; or (3) the insured's expectations are objectively reasona-
ble in light of the circumstances and facts of the case.15 4 In the con-
text of this version, the reasonable expectations doctrine is an
instrument of contract enforcement.
The seminal opinion in which the court applied the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine to a collision damage waiver provision is Automo-
bile Leasing & Rental, Inc. v. Thomas.155 In Thomas, defendant
Virginia Thomas rented a car from Americar while vacationing in Las
Vegas. The lease agreement provided Thomas with the option of
purchasing a collision damage waiver provision pursuant to which the
lessor would waive all liability claims against the renter provided the
car was "used in conformity with [the] rental agreement."15 6 Thomas
purchased this option and was subsequently involved in an accident
when her car was struck from behind while making a left turn.
Thomas received a citation for making a left turn from an improper
position.
Lessor's main argument at trial was that Thomas breached the
lease agreement because she failed to use the car in conformity with
the lease agreement. More specifically, lessor contended that Thomas
violated the prohibitive use restriction which provided that the car not
be used in an "unlawful manner." According to lessor the fact that
151. See supra note 114.
152. See supra note 146.
153. At least five jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable expectation doctrine and
concluded that it may be applied even in the absence of ambiguity. See, e.g., May-
nard v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328 (Alaska 1995); Amoco Oil v.
Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Brooks, 686 P.2d
23 (Haw. 1984); West Trucking Line, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 262
(Iowa 1990); Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 1272 (N.J. 1994).
At least five states have expressly rejected the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions. See, e.g., Deni Assoc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135
(Fla. 1998); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 987 P.2d 1043 (Idaho 1999); Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v. Adkisson, 459 N.E.2d 310 (111. App. Ct. 1984); Sterling Merchandise Co. v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Allen, 839 P.2d at 807.
154. See supra note 153.
155. 679 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1984).
156. Id. at 1270.
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Thomas was making a left turn from an improper position and re-
ceived a citation for doing so voided the policy.
The Thomas court, in an extremely short opinion, noted that the
appropriate interpretive approach was the objectively reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured. The court, applying the narrow version of
the doctrine, concluded that the waiver agreement was ambiguous be-
cause the limitation on coverage was neither apparent from the face of
the agreement nor from a simple reading of the contract.15 7 Conse-
quently, an ordinary reader, such as Thomas, would not have assumed
that the coverage purchased only covered accidents not caused by the
negligence of the purchaser.
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of Alaska in
Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales & Serv.1 8 In Lauvetz, Thomas Lauvetz and
John Osborne leased a car from Alaska Sales and Service. During the
process of leasing the car Osborne received an offer for an optional
collision damage waiver, and he accepted it. The collision damage
waiver added $8.95 per day to the basic daily rental rate.
There were no indications of the scope of the collision damage
waiver on the face of the rental agreement. However, directly above
the collision damage waiver box were the words "See Terms and Con-
ditions." The right flap of the travel folder, which opened into three
panels, contained the terms and conditions. The terms and conditions
were printed in black and were legible. Neither Lauvetz nor Osborne
read the terms and conditions.
Several days following the lease, the vehicle was damaged while
Lauvetz was driving. Lauvetz was intoxicated at the time of the acci-
dent. He was charged with reckless driving, to which he pled no con-
test. Alaska Sales subsequently filed suit against both Lauvetz and
Osborne seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Alaska Sales
contended that Lauvetz's intoxication and reckless driving violated
two prohibitive use restrictions contained in the rental agreement.
The court in Lauvetz expressly examined the merits of whether the
narrow or broad version of the reasonable expectations doctrine
should be applied to the facts of the case. Opting for application of the
broader version the court observed that the relevant question
is not whether a prohibition against drunk driving is unreasonable; any
renter would certainly know that the law prohibits drunk driving on pain of
severe penalties. Rather, the relevant question here is whether the purchaser
of the damage waiver reasonably expected the waiver to be subject to any ex-
clusions. We conclude that a consumer would not reasonably expect the dam-
age waiver to be less than complete. 1 5 9
157. See id. at 1270-71.
158. 828 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991).
159. Id. at 165 (citation omitted).
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Despite the existence of two distinct versions, it is universally ac-
cepted that the reasonable expectations doctrine is closely "related to
the policy against unconscionable terms and the rule of interpreta-
tions against the draftsman" 160 - ambiguity.
V. COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE
Part D - Coverage for Damage to Your Auto provides two forms of
automobile property protection - collision and comprehensive.' 6 '
Comprehensive coverage, if purchased, is provided under the policy
language "Other Than Collision Coverage." 16 2 Other than collision
coverage is rarely, if ever, specifically defined in the policy. Rather,
most policies contain a list of perils that supposedly constitute loss
caused by other than collision.' 6 3 This list, however, neither defines
the phrase nor provides a comprehensive-all-inclusive listing of the
perils that are covered under other than collision coverage. Other
than collision or comprehensive insurance is an all-risk164 form of
property insurance. The protection afforded by the coverage is subject
only to the exclusions in the auto physical damage section of the policy
and the requirement that the loss be direct and accidental.' 65 Com-
prehensive coverage protects against direct and accidental losses. By
virtue of this language and the purpose of the coverage, any provision
defining "losses" insured to include only those losses that were "direct
and accidental" does not relieve the insurer of liability for losses
caused by the intentional acts of third parties.i 6 6 A contrary construc-
tion would contravene public policy because a provision of such nature
would negate the coverage expressly afforded for theft, larceny, or
vandalism - all intentional acts.' 67
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 211 cmt. f (1981).
161. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
162. See id.
163. Losses caused by the following are considered to be other than "collision":
1. Missiles or falling objects;
2. Fire;
3. Theft or larceny;
4. Explosion or earthquake;
5. Hail, water, or flood;
6. Malicious mischief or vandalism;
7. Riot or civil commotion;
8. Contact with bird or animal;
9. Breakage of glass
See PERSONAL AuTo POLICY supra note 9.
164. An all-risks or open perils policy covers all accidental losses except those that are
specifically excluded.
165. See supra notes 99 and 100 and accompanying text.
166. See 11 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 23, chap. 156, § 156:20, at 156-35.
167. See supra note 163.
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Under a comprehensive policy covering "direct and accidental
losses" the insured has the burden of proving that the loss satisfies
both prerequisites. As is the case with collision coverage, "direct" re-
fers to causal relationship and means immediate or proximate - not
remote.' 68 Likewise, "accidental" means sudden and unexpected from
the standpoint of the insured. In the context of comprehensive insur-
ance, the perspective of the insured approach rarely, if ever, emanates
out of expressed policy language as is the case in automobile liability
insurance. Rather, because collision and comprehensive insurance
are forms of property insurance, courts, for policy reasons, impliedly
recognize not only the insurer's but also society's interest in discourag-
ing moral hazard and unjust enrichment. Consequently, comprehen-
sive insurance provisions that exclude coverage for non-accidental or
intentional losses caused by the insured are valid. 169 However, the
presumed validity of these provisions does not alone resolve the ques-
tion of whether an insurer should automatically be relieved from its
obligations to provide comprehensive coverage when (1) a vehicle has
been used in an unlawful manner; or (2) an unlawful event may have
occurred during its use by the insured.
As observed earlier in the discussion of liability insurance and the
intentional injury exclusion, the perspective of the insured approach
has two dimensions. Pursuant to the first dimension, the insurer is
relieved of its obligations under the policy if the insured acted with
specific intent to cause the loss.1 70 Specific intent does not exist
where the insured's intentional act results in unintentional loss.i 71
Rather, specific intent requires that the insured intended the conse-
quences of his intentional act.172 The second dimension, used to as-
sess whether a loss is accidental, is to infer intent to cause harm
where the loss is the natural and probable consequence of the in-
sured's intentional act.' 7 3 This approach focuses on what a reasona-
ble person would view as the probable consequence of an act, rather
than on the insured's subjective state of mind.' 74 Because automobile
insurance litigation is especially fact-sensitive, the question whether
an insurer is relieved of his obligation to provide comprehensive cover-
age because the loss was not accidental must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis. Neither dimension of the insured approach, when applied
to cases involving losses which arise out of (1) simple traffic violations;
or (2) violation of vehicle maintenance laws, should relieve an insurer
168. See supra note 99.
169. For the same reasons the illegal activities exclusion need not be expressly set out
in the policy.
170. See supra note 63.
171. See id.
172. See supra note 64.
173. See supra note 65.
174. See supra note 66.
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of its obligation to provide coverage. On the other hand, either dimen-
sion would relieve the insurer when the loss arises out of an insured's
outright criminal act. Likewise, the second dimension could, but not
necessarily, be applied to relieve the insurer of its obligation in cases
involving intoxication.1 7 5 This result is at least plausible because a
reasonable person could view any injury resulting from an automobile
wreck as a natural and probable consequence of intoxication.
The perspective of the insured approach does not exist in a vac-
uum; consequently, it should not be the sole consideration in deter-
mining whether a violation of an illegal activity provision relieves the
insurer of its obligation to provide comprehensive coverage. The man-
ner in which courts have treated coverage disputes involving collision
insurance strongly suggests that, while maybe not as great as those
concerns regarding automobile liability insurance, there are policy
concerns about automobile property insurance, as well. For example,
the doctrines of ambiguity, unconscionability, and reasonable expecta-
tions reflect a strong judicial policy in favor of leveling the playing
field in insurance contract interpretation. Metaphorically speaking,
these doctrines represent an equity continuum designed to maintain
the careful balance between the interests of the insurer in freedom of
contract and those of the insured in obtaining the coverage purchased.
Thus, located at one end of the continuum is the doctrine of ambiguity
- one of the oldest and most favored variance principles. At the other
end of the continuum is the broad version of the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine - a doctrine specifically oriented toward consumer pro-
tection. Application of these doctrines to the issue of whether a loss is
accidental for purposes of comprehensive coverage is, however, no
more convenient than the standpoint of the insured approach. How-
ever, the doctrines of ambiguity, unconscionability, and reasonable ex-
pectations allow courts to consider (1) the nature and type of
insurance involved; (2) the purpose for which it was purchased; (3) the
expectations of the insured; (4) the substantive fairness of the manner
175. As observed by a noted commentator:
Under some circumstances harm caused to the insured automobile by
the insured when driving while intoxicated is classified as harm inten-
tionally caused and recovery may be denied. Thus, it has been held that
applying the rule that a party cannot insure against his own knavery as
public policy does not sanction such contracts, and that this includes in-
surance both against the consequences of criminal acts, and against the
wilful, reckless, or fraudulent acts of the insured, even though the policy
does not so stipulate, it has been held that one who destroys his insured
automobile by driving it while intoxicated must be regarded as having
intended so to destroy it, and that the insurer is consequently relieved of
liability.
18 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw, § 74:652 (2d ed. 1983).
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in which the policy was sold; (5) the commercial fairness of enforcing
the restriction against the insured.17 6
As observed earlier, "the strong public policy favoring liability in-
surance coverage to protect the public at large is generally absent
from the analysis in the context of property insurance"17 7 - collision
and comprehensive coverages. One should not read too much into or
out of this observation. The doctrines used to interpret insurance con-
tracts and remedy egregious breaches thereof suggest that society has
a strong interest in the marketing, distribution, and enforcement of
insurance contracts in general. Because insurance, in general, is in-
fected with a quasi-public interest, public policy, to some degree, is an
inherent component of insurance contract interpretation. 178
Public policy references the law of the jurisdiction as reflected in
the Constitution, statutes, or decisions of the courts.17 9 The doctrines
of ambiguity, unconscionability, and reasonable expectations are equi-
table concepts that reflect judicial policy. Consequently, the policy de-
termination of whether the mere fact that (1) a vehicle has been used
in an unlawful manner; or, (2) an unlawful event may have occurred
during its use by the insured, should relieve the insurer of its obliga-
tion to provide comprehensive coverage depends upon a balancing of
society's interest in preventing moral hazards against its interest in
affording the protection provided by comprehensive coverage. In per-
forming this balance, courts should consider (1) the parties' justified
expectations; (2) the forfeiture resulting from denial of enforcement;
(3) the public interest in enforcement of the particular provision. 18 0
These considerations are to be weighed against (1) the strength of the
public policy, as manifested by statute and judicial decisions; (2) the
likelihood that denial of enforcement will further that policy; (3) the
seriousness of any misconduct involved; (4) the extent to which it was
176. See supra Part IV, sections A-C.
177. See supra note 95.
178. See Johnny C. Parker, The Development of First-Party Extracontractual Insur-
ance Litigation in Oklahoma: An Analytical Examination, 31 TULSA L.J. 57
(1995).
Insurance contracts, unlike other private agreements, are unique be-
cause they implicate important public policy concerns. Consequently,
the development of insurance principles and doctrines has been influ-
enced by judicial 'perceptions about the interests of society in the resolu-
tion of the dispute.'
Id. at 59.
Finally, the insurance industry has undertaken to provide a service
which affects the public interest. As a result, such contracts are viewed
as a quasi-public industry - a proper subject for intense legislative and
judicial regulation and scrutiny.
Id. at 62.
179. See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Safway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d
693 (Tex. App. 1987); In re Estate of Harrington, 648 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1982).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2)(a)-(c)(1981).
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deliberate; (5) the directness of the connection between that miscon-
duct and the term.18 1 This approach evidences the generally accepted
rule that a provision of an insurance contract, though unambiguous
and otherwise valid, is void if the interest in enforcing the provision is
outweighed by a contrary policy.. 8 2
181. See id. § 178(3)(a)-(d).
182. See id. § 178.
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